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Abstract 
We examine the relation between indexing and active management in the mutual fund industry 
worldwide. Explicit indexing and closet indexing by active funds are associated with countries’ 
regulatory and financial market environments. We find that actively managed funds are more 
active and charge lower fees when they face more competitive pressure from low-cost explicitly 
indexed funds. A quasi-natural experiment using the exogenous variation in indexed funds 
generated by the passage of pension laws supports a causal interpretation of the results. 
Moreover, the average alpha generated by active management is higher in countries with more 
explicit indexing and lower in countries with more closet indexing. Overall, our evidence 
suggests that explicit indexing improves competition in the mutual fund industry. 
 
Keywords: Mutual funds, Active management, Index funds, Exchange-traded funds, 
Competition, Fees, Performance  
JEL classification: G15, G18, G23 
                                                 
* A previous version of this article was circulated under the title “The Mutual Fund Industry Worldwide: Explicit 
and Closet Indexing, Fees, and Performance”. We thank Andres Almazan, Wayne Ferson, Javier Gil-Bazo, Fabian 
Irek, Hao Jiang, Andrew Karolyi, Aneel Keswani, Borja Larrain, Lilian Ng, Henri Servaes, Mikhail Simutin, 
Sheridan Titman, Michaela Verardo, Albert Wang, Jeffrey Wurgler, and Tong Yao; seminar participants at Arizona 
State University, Cass Business School, Cornell University, George Washington University, Imperial College, 
Instituto de Empresa, Rice University, State Street Global Advisors, Stockholm School of Economics-SIFR, 
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, University of Colorado Boulder, University of Lugano, University of 
Mannheim, University of Melbourne, University of New South Wales, University of Sidney, University of Southern 
California, University of Technology Sidney, University of Utah, and University of Virginia-Darden School of 
Business; and conference participants at the American Finance Association Meetings, China International 
Conference in Finance, City University of Hong Kong International Conference, European Finance Association 
Meetings, FMA European Meetings, Inquire Europe Conference, McGill Global Asset Management Conference, 
Morningstar Europe Conference, Morningstar-Ibbotson Investment Conference, Rothschild Caesarea Center 
Conference, Rotterdam School of Management Professional Asset Management Conference, SFS Cavalcade 
Conference, and University of British Columbia Summer Conference for helpful comments. We also thank the 
sponsors of the S&P Dow Jones Indices’ SPIVA award (runner up). The authors acknowledge financial support 




Practitioners and academics have long debated the societal benefits and degree of 
competition in the asset management industry, particularly among equity mutual funds. This 
debate has focused primarily on two dimensions – the relative value of passive versus active 
management and the question of price competition in the mutual fund industry.1 In this paper, we 
contribute to this debate by examining actively and passively managed equity mutual funds in 32 
countries. Elucidating this debate is particularly important because much of the recent growth in 
assets in the mutual fund industry has been in explicitly indexed equity funds (index funds and 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs)), which have grown from constituting about 14% of assets under 
management in 2002 to about 22% in 2010. These explicitly indexed funds have thus become a 
common low-cost alternative for investors to access the stock market, allowing them to buy 
“beta exposure” (i.e., investing in a diversified portfolio tracking a stock index) at substantially 
lower fees compared to active funds.  
 In a Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) world, one would expect passive and active funds to co-
exist in equilibrium with their relative market shares depending on information costs and overall 
market efficiency. Thus, the empirical observation of flows into explicitly indexed funds has 
implications for how such an equilibrium would be expected to change. In particular, Coates and 
Hubbard (2007) and Khorana and Servaes (2012) suggest that mutual fund markets in the United 
States and elsewhere are competitive, but that they have different levels of competition.2 In 
                                                 
1 For evidence on the value of active management in the mutual fund industry, see, for example, Sharpe (1966), 
Jensen (1968), Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993), Gruber (1996), Wermers (2000), Bollen and Busse (2001), 
Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), Avramov and Wermers (2006), Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers, and 
White (2006), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), French (2008), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), and Busse, Goyal, and 
Wahal (2014). For evidence on competition in the industry, see for example, Elton, Gruber, and Busse (2004), 
Hortacsu and Syverson (2004), Collins (2005), Coates and Hubbard (2007), Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009), 
Wahal and Wang (2011), and Khorana and Servaes (2012). 
2 Some research suggests that perfect competition may not exist in the mutual fund industry or that mutual funds 
may be perceived as differentiated goods by retail investors due to sizable information/search frictions or investor 
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addition, Wahal and Wang (2011) show that the entry of new active funds that are close 
substitutes to incumbent funds creates competitive pressure for the incumbent funds to decrease 
their fees. We build on this evidence and hypothesize that increasing competition from indexed 
funds will lead active funds to compete via price (by lowering their fees) and/or product 
differentiation (by diverging more from their benchmark index). This competitive pressure could 
benefit fund investors directly through lower fees and indirectly through stronger incentives for 
skilled active managers to collect information and generate alpha. 
The alternative hypothesis is that active and passive fund markets are largely segmented such 
that investors do not consider these fund types to be substitutes. Rather the investors may 
perceive active funds as differentiated investment vehicles, which then have higher fees as 
compensation for alpha generation or for satisfying different investor needs than what is 
delivered by passive funds.3 In this case increasing market shares for indexed funds may not lead 
to lower fees and higher differentiation by the active funds. Such an outcome would be similar to 
the “generics paradox” phenomenon in the pharmaceutical industry where researchers have 
shown that the introduction of generic drugs (which would be analogous to index funds and 
ETFs in our context) does not necessarily lead to the expected price drops by the branded drugs 
(which would be analogous to fees of active funds in our context).4   
In segmented mutual fund markets in which active funds face reduced inflows to their market 
segment due to the increased presence of index funds, the active funds could increase fees to 
                                                                                                                                                             
irrationality (Elton, Gruber, and Busse, 2004; Hortacsu and Syverson, 2004; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2010; 
Carlin and Manso, 2011). 
3 Collins (2005) argues that funds may differ, for example, on the services provided to fund shareholders. And even 
if investors only care about returns, passive funds are not pure substitutes to active funds because of the potential for 
alpha. Berk and Green (2004) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2012) argue that fund managers may have skill and 
investors invest in active funds even in the absence of ex post average positive alphas.  
4 The empirical literature on generic drugs finds that generics are cheaper and gain market share, but their entry does 
not result in lower prices for the branded drugs; see, for example, Frank and Salkever (1997) and Vandoros and 
Kanovos (2012). The Economist (2014) makes a similar analogy between indexed funds and white-label goods. 
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cover higher marketing expenses. Additionally, as the active fund managers care about their 
relative performance vis-à-vis benchmark indices (Basak and Pavlova, 2013), an increased fear 
of losing more assets could lead managers to increase the fraction of stocks in the portfolio that 
belong to their benchmark indices to avoid underperformance. Consistent with this alternative 
hypothesis, Wurgler (2011) argues that the growth of index-based investing could allow stock 
prices to be more divorced from the firms’ fundamentals, thereby lowering fund managers’ 
incentives to gather information, in which case the managers’ funds may perform worse. Thus, 
the alternative hypothesis posits that an increased market share of indexed funds will lead to 
active fund managers maintaining their current investment strategy or even becoming less active 
and resisting downward pressure on their fees.5 
Our multi-country sample with equity mutual funds and ETFs from 32 countries is an ideal 
testing ground for these hypotheses due to the wide variation in conditions across markets and 
the fact that financial markets tend to be segmented across countries (e.g., Stulz, 2005). We 
consider the segmentation in the mutual fund industry through consideration of the countries in 
which funds are domiciled or sold.6 
We first document the extent of explicit indexing in each country, finding considerable cross-
country and time series variation. Over our sample period, the market share of explicitly indexed 
funds grew from 14% of assets under management in 2002 to 22% in 2010, with the popularity 
of explicit indexing particularly rising after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. However, not all 
indexing in mutual funds is necessarily explicit as some so-called “active” funds are largely 
passively managed, even if their managers market the funds and charge fees as if they are active 
                                                 
5 This argument is based on price effects that are associated with a stock being included in a popular benchmark 
index. Further, if demand shocks for stocks included in the index lead to sustained price premiums for these stocks, 
it becomes harder for active managers to outperform by buying stocks that are not included in the index.  
6 The European Union, for example, has adopted the “European passport” system (Directive 2001/107/EC), which 
facilitates cross-border marketing of mutual funds among European Union member countries. 
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(a practice that is commonly termed “closet indexing”). To examine this behavior, we use fund 
portfolio holdings to calculate the Cremers and Petajisto (2009) active share measure, which 
captures the proportion of a fund’s holdings that differs from its benchmark. If fund holdings 
largely overlap with index holdings, investors are effectively earning index-like gross returns 
(the beta part of return), which they could obtain at lower fees through explicitly indexed funds. 
Our results show that closet indexing is common. Defining closet indexers as funds with an 
active share below 60% (following the cutoff established in Cremers and Petajisto (2009)), we 
find that about 20% of the worldwide mutual fund assets are managed by closet indexers.7 Our 
results are similar when we consider alternative measures of activeness, such as measuring a 
fund’s active share against the portfolio of active funds that track a fund’s benchmark. This 
alternative measure is inspired by the overlap measure of Wahal and Wang (2011).  
Our tests regarding the effects of explicit indexing (in terms of market share and shareholder 
costs) support the hypothesis that increased competition from explicit indexing benefits investors 
in active funds. Specifically, we find that active funds have higher active shares and charge 
lower fees in markets with more explicit indexing. In contrast, active funds charge higher fees in 
countries with more closet indexing. These differences are economically important. For example, 
a decline in the fees of indexed funds by 50 basis points is associated with 16 basis points lower 
fees charged by active funds. 
One potential concern regarding our empirical tests is that explicitly indexed funds’ market 
shares and costs are likely jointly determined with active funds’ active share and fees. We show 
that the results are robust when we use benchmark and country fixed effects to address the 
                                                 
7 A manager who tries to beat the benchmark should have a minimum active share of at least 50%, since half the 
assets (by weight) in the benchmark will have a return above the benchmark return (which is the asset-weighted 
average return of the assets in the benchmark). We obtain consistent results when we use a 50% cutoff, rather than 
the 60% cutoff we use throughout the analysis 
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concern that the availability of explicit indexing might be related to some unobserved (and time 
invariant) benchmark or country characteristic that explains the active share and fees of active 
funds. To further address this potential endogeneity issue we consider a quasi-natural 
experiment, i.e., the staggered passage of pension legislation in many of the countries in our 
sample. These Pension Acts generally aim to facilitate a shift from government-sponsored 
defined-benefit (DB) pension systems towards defined-contribution (DC) pension systems and 
include policy changes designed to increase market competition, such as easy access to mutual 
funds that offer market exposure (for example, by offering at least one passive fund in the menu 
of investment options). The Economist (2014) argues that, with these Pension Acts, “(…) 
governments are also pushing pension providers to opt for low-cost funds. (….) Such measures 
make it likely that more investments will flow into tracker funds.” The Pension Acts help to 
resolve the endogeneity problem to the extent that their timing should be largely related to 
legislative agendas in particular countries, rather than driven by fund industry conditions.  
We use a differences-in-differences estimator that compares the differences in outcomes in 
the group of countries before and after the year of a country’s Pension Act passage versus a 
control group that includes all countries not passing a Pension Act in the same year. Using this 
approach, we find that active funds increase their active share and decrease their fees following 
the passage of a Pension Act in their country of domicile or sale.  
Finally, we examine the performance from investing in truly active funds and whether the 
performance relates to the availability of explicitly indexed products. Thus, we first measure the 
ability of the active funds in these markets to provide not just beta exposure but to also generate 
alpha. We find that a fund’s active share predicts its future risk-adjusted performance. The effect 
is economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in active share is associated with 
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an increase of about 1% per year in benchmark-adjusted returns and 0.7% per year in four-factor 
alpha. These results for an international sample are consistent with the earlier Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009) results for the U.S. market.  
Next and more importantly, we provide evidence that the average alpha generated by active 
management is higher in countries where low-cost passive alternatives are more popular, while 
the average alpha is lower in markets where closet indexing is more prevalent. Overall, our 
evidence suggests that enhanced competitive pressure from index funds and ETFs creates more 
incentives for skilled managers to pass on alpha to fund investors whereas closet indexing has 
the opposite effect.  
In sum, our findings suggest that the availability of explicit indexing is associated with 
improved levels of competition in a fund industry, while closet indexing is indicative of the 
reverse. Previous evidence regarding competition in the mutual fund industry has primarily 
focused on the U.S. market (e.g., Wahal and Wang, 2011). The few papers analyzing the mutual 
fund industry worldwide have so far focused on the determinants of industry size and fees across 
countries. Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2005, 2009) find a positive link between the level of 
development of fund industries worldwide and a combination of legal, regulatory, and demand- 
and supply-side factors. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study how indexing is 
related to the structure and performance of actively managed mutual funds around the world.   
2. Data and Variables 
Our analysis uses two primary databases: Lipper and FactSet/LionShares. The Lipper 
database provides a comprehensive sample of mutual funds offered across a large number of 
countries. Mutual funds, while taking a variety of names around the globe, are fairly comparable 
investment vehicles worldwide (Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano, 2005). We focus exclusively on 
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open-end equity mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in the 2002-2010 period. From 
this database we obtain individual fund characteristics, such as fund name, domicile, sponsor, 
benchmark, monthly returns, total net assets (TNA), fees, and expenses. The data is survivorship 
bias-free, as it includes both active and defunct funds. Although multiple share classes are listed 
as separate observations in Lipper, they have the same holdings and the same returns before 
expenses. Thus, we keep as our unit of observation the share class that Lipper identifies as the 
primary share class and aggregate fund-level variables across the different share classes. As we 
describe below, we also conduct some tests using the individual share classes.8 
The sample comprises 24,492 funds with a combined TNA totaling over $9.8 trillion as of 
December 2010. This means that mutual funds held roughly 20% of world stock market 
capitalization. We identify funds’ nationalities by their legal domicile, which characterizes the 
relevant regulatory and legal system. Table 1 lists the 32 countries with at least 50 funds, 
including the three countries with off-shore domiciles (Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg).9  
The LionShares database covers portfolio equity holdings for institutional investors 
worldwide, including mutual funds and ETFs. Ferreira and Matos (2008) provide a detailed 
description of this data source. We match the Lipper (fund characteristics and performance) and 
LionShares (fund holdings) databases by CUSIP, ISIN or fund name.  
Panel A of Table 1 provides key statistics on the sample of funds for which portfolio 
holdings are available by country of domicile as of December 2010. It shows that detailed 
holdings are available from LionShares for 11,776 funds with TNA of approximately $7.9 
                                                 
8 In the European Union, mutual funds fall under the umbrella of UCITS (Undertakings for Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities), a regulatory attempt to harmonize investment vehicles across the EU.  
9 Lipper’s coverage of funds can be compared with aggregate statistics on mutual funds from other sources. As of 
December 2010, the Investment Company Institute (2011) reported a total of 27,754 equity mutual funds worldwide 
with a TNA of $10.5 trillion. Therefore, we conclude that the Lipper sample is nearly comprehensive of the equity 
mutual fund universe. 
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trillion. In total, we have holdings data from the LionShares database for about 81% of the TNA 
in the Lipper database, but coverage varies across countries.10  
We control for fund and country characteristics in our subsequent tests. Table IA.1 in the 
Internet Appendix provides summary statistics of all variables for the sample of open-end active 
equity funds in the 2002-2010 period, and Table IA.2 reports time series averages of country 
variables per country. Appendix A provides all variable definitions. 
3. Explicit and Closet Fund Indexing Around the World 
3.1. Explicit Indexing 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the number of funds per country using the funds’ declared 
investment type according to their prospectus disclosures as of December 2010. There are a total 
of 1,218 explicitly indexed funds, which consists of 561 ETFs and 657 traditional index funds 
with $1.7 trillion in assets under management ($0.8 trillion in ETFs and $0.9 trillion in index 
funds) at the end of our sample period.11 There are also 10,558 active funds with $6.2 trillion in 
assets under management. Although passively managed funds have become increasingly popular, 
active funds still vastly dominate mutual fund markets throughout the world. 
Before testing our hypotheses on the effects of explicitly indexed funds on a country’s fund 
industry, we first document the availability of explicitly indexed funds across the different 
countries. Panel A of Table 1 shows that 22% of equity mutual fund assets under management 
worldwide are explicitly indexed as of 2010. For many funds in our sample, the country of 
domicile corresponds to the single country of sale, while other funds are registered for sale in 
                                                 
10 LionShares’ coverage of fund holdings is lower in some countries because disclosure is not mandatory. We obtain 
similar results when we exclude these countries and conclude that our results are not driven by selective disclosure. 
11 We recognize that ETFs can be used by investors for market timing and other investment strategies beyond purely 
beta exposure, thus, they may not always be viewed as substitute investment products relative to active funds. 
Because they are an important source of beta exposure for many investors, we combine them together with index 
funds and define both as the set of explicitly indexed funds available to investors. 
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multiple countries. These multi-country registrations create competition across domiciles.  
Panel B of Table 1 provides the key statistics for our sample alternatively based on the fund 
share class by country of sale at the end of our sample period.12 While Panel A shows that some 
countries have no passively managed funds domiciled in their country, Panel B shows that the 
competitive landscape for funds is much broader when the country of sale is considered because 
large asset managers domiciled in particular in Ireland (or Luxembourg) offer their index (active) 
funds across European markets. While both Panels A and B suggest that roughly one-fifth of 
equity fund assets are explicitly indexed, there is substantial variation across countries.13 Because 
of the different advantages and disadvantages of the two perspectives, we adopt both country of 
domicile and country of sale in our tests. 
3.2. Active Funds and Closet Indexing 
We differentiate active management versus closet indexing using the active share measure 
developed by Cremers and Petajisto (2009). The measure represents the share of portfolio 
holdings that differs from the benchmark index holdings and is calculated as: 
	 ∑ , ,  (1) 
where wfund,i and wbenchmark,i are the portfolio weights of stock i in the fund and its benchmark 
index, respectively, and the sum is taken over the universe of stocks. For a mutual fund that does 
                                                 
12 Table IA.3 in the Internet Appendix provides details on the number of share classes by country of domicile and 
country of sale in 2010. Because some funds have multiple share classes and are offered in more than one country, 
we can have multiple observations for the same fund in a given year. For each fund share class, Lipper provides the 
list of countries where it is approved for sale but does not have the exact amount of shares that were sold to each 
market. We basically multiply each fund share class for each country of sale and that causes some duplication. Some 
aggregate totals in Panel B of Table 1 suffer from this issue. 
13 The calculation of the market share of explicitly indexed funds does not require LionShares holdings data. To 
investigate the possibility of selection bias from using the sample of 11,776 funds with holdings data in LionShares, 
we calculate the market share of explicit indexing using the sample of 24,492 funds in Lipper (i.e., including those 
without holdings data). The degree of explicit indexing is similar to that reported in Table 1. 
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not short stocks or buy on margin, its active share will always lie between zero and 100%.14  
Our analysis of active management requires the identification of funds’ benchmarks. We use 
benchmarks independently assigned by Lipper according to their assessment of a fund’s 
investment strategy.15 Table IA.4 in the Internet Appendix lists the 88 specific benchmarks, 
which can be classified into three types: world (funds that invest worldwide), regional (funds that 
invest in a specific geographic region), and country (funds that invest in a specific country). 
Some of the world, regional, and country funds may have specific industry or investment styles. 
We keep only benchmarks with at least $10 billion of assets under management in 2010. For 
some countries with less than $10 billion of assets under management, we keep the major 
country index as the benchmark. 
We construct portfolio weights for the 88 different benchmark indices using the aggregate 
portfolio holdings of the explicitly indexed funds tracking each benchmark.16 Therefore, the 
active share is measured in excess of explicitly indexed funds. Using the actual weights of 
explicitly indexed funds tracking each benchmark has the advantage that some of the weights in 
the official benchmark include stocks that, in practice, may not be fully investable by mutual 
funds due to illiquidity or other constraints. On average (TNA-weighted), active funds in our 
sample have an active share of 69%, while passive funds have an active share of 16%.17 
Table 1 and Fig. 1 provide the market share (as a percentage of TNA) of closet indexers and 
                                                 
14 Given our international setting, funds may hold different securities in the same company (e.g., common shares, 
depository receipts, and dual listings) that represent the same stake in a company. We therefore sum all equity 
holdings in the same company as part of the portfolio position. 
15 Using the Lipper “Technical Indicator Benchmark” rather than the “Fund Manager Benchmark” (which is self-
declared by the fund), we avoid the concern that the fund strategically chooses its benchmark. In addition, the Fund 
Manager Benchmark is sparsely available, which reduces the sample size. However, in unreported analyses, we find 
similar results with the Fund Manager Benchmark in this smaller sample. 
16 The benchmark weights are calculated excluding synthetic ETFs that do not physically replicate the underlying 
benchmark index. In addition, for about 2% of the fund-year observations there are not at least five explicitly 
indexed funds tracking a particular benchmark. For these cases, we use as an alternative the aggregate portfolio of 
all active funds that track that benchmark.  
17 Explicitly indexed funds may have non-zero active shares if they do not engage in full physical index replication. 
For example, passive funds that track the S&P 500 index have an average active share of 4%.  
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truly active funds across countries of domicile as of December 2010. We use an active share 
below 60% as the cutoff for an active fund to be classified as a closet indexer as in Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009).18 All other funds with active shares equal to or above 60% are classified as truly 
active. We find considerable variation in the extent of closet indexing across countries. In 
countries with little explicit indexing, the active funds are relatively passive. Although in Table 1 
we report on active share for the final year in our sample, we find that the active share of funds is 
an extremely persistent fund attribute over time (the average serial correlation of active share at 
the fund-level is 0.95). Table IA.5 in the Internet Appendix reports the levels of explicit and 
closet indexing by country and benchmark type.19 Fig. 2 shows the time series of the market 
shares of explicitly indexed funds, closet indexers and truly active funds over 2002-2010.  
3.3. Fees 
We measure fees and expenses charged to mutual fund shareholders using the total expense 
ratio (TER) and loads. TER is broader than just management fees and includes all annual 
expenses that a fund charges its investors for investment management, administration, servicing, 
transfer agency, audit, and legal costs. Because TER excludes certain distribution fees, such as 
front-end or back-end loads, we calculate the average annual total shareholder costs (TSC), 
which is defined as TER plus one-fifth of the front-end load following Khorana, Servaes, and 
Tufano (2009). This calculation assumes the typical investor holds a fund for five years, and that 
back-end loads are waived if the fund is held for that length of time. If information on TER is not 
                                                 
18 An active share of 60% means that 40% of the fund portfolio weights overlap with the benchmark index weights. 
The 60% cutoff is somewhat arbitrary, but as, on average, half the holdings (by asset weight) in any portfolio will 
beat the portfolio’s average return, then an active fund (with a manager who tries to beat the benchmark) should 
have an active share of at least 50%. In addition, the 60% threshold corresponds to classifying funds in the bottom 
tercile of the distribution of active share as closet indexers. 
19 We cannot differentiate between closet indexers that do not attempt to deviate from their benchmarks from those 
that ex ante commit resources to identify private information but ex post fail in identifying such opportunities. 
Observationally these cases are equivalent, as both funds exhibit low active share measures. 
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available (13% of the fund-year observations), we use instead the annual management fee, which 
constitutes a lower bound for the TER.20  
The last three columns of Panels A and B in Table 1 report the (TNA-weighted) average TSC 
per country for each of the different fund types (explicitly indexed, closet indexers, and truly 
active) as of the end of 2010. Whether considering country of domicile or country of sale, the 
costs for explicitly indexed funds are lower than for active funds across all countries. In most 
countries of domicile, closet indexers are as costly as truly active funds, with an average TSC of 
1.64% and 1.66% per year, respectively. Fig. 3 illustrates the range of the average TSC across 
the three types of funds for each country in our sample. These statistics confirm that explicitly 
indexed funds are a low-cost alternative to active funds worldwide but closet indexers charge 
fees at par with those of truly active funds.  
4. Determinants of Explicit and Closet Indexing Across Countries 
Explicitly indexed funds provide a low-cost alternative for investors to get beta exposure, 
while closet indexers offer that same beta exposure but at higher fees. The evidence so far has 
shown wide variation in the range of fees across countries suggesting that some degree of market 
segmentation exists. A major influence on market segmentation arises from the funds’ location, 
i.e., the regulatory environment and conditions in the local fund industry. For example, Khorana, 
Servaes, and Tufano (2005, 2009) show that countries with stronger regulations and laws tend to 
have larger mutual fund industries, lower fund costs and a higher spectrum of funds offered. 
These results suggest that if competition is driving the effects, then we should find more low-cost 
explicitly indexed products (and fewer closet indexers) in environments with stronger regulations 
                                                 
20 The TSC ignores annual fees charged by distributers as well as bid-ask spreads in the case of ETFs, which are 
typically narrow. For example, Morningstar (2012) reports that the Lyxor ETF Euro Stoxx 50 (the largest ETF on 
the Euro Stoxx 50 index) had a trailing 30-day average spread of 0.017% at the NYSE Euronext Paris. 
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and more developed fund industries.   
Table 2 provides results on the determinants of explicit and closet indexing across countries 
over the sample period, where we define the market alternatively by country of domicile (Panel 
A) and country of sale (Panel B). We use two measures of explicit indexing as dependent 
variables. Explicit indexing (% TNA) is the market share of explicitly indexed funds as a 
percentage of the TNA in each country in a given year. Explicit indexing (average TSC) is the 
TNA-weighted average total shareholder cost (TSC) of explicitly indexed funds in each country 
in a given year. We also use a measure of the extent of closet indexing in a market, Closet 
indexing (% TNA), which is the market share of active funds with an active share below 60% as a 
percentage of the TNA in each country in a given year. 
We examine the country-level determinants in separate regressions due to the limited number 
of country-year observations in our sample. In columns (1), (3), and (5) we test whether indexing 
is related to regulatory factors (Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano, 2005): the extent to which 
regulatory approvals are required to set up a fund (Approval) and the quality of a country’s 
judicial system (Judicial).21 We find that a more restrictive regulatory approval regime for new 
funds is positively associated with the availability of explicit indexing. The economic impacts of 
Approval and Judicial are significant. For example, if one takes the estimates in column (1) of 
Panel A, an increase in Approval from one to two is associated with an increase of about 6% in 
the market share of explicitly indexed funds. Given the relatively low market share of explicitly 
indexed funds across most countries, this is a large effect. Columns (3) and (5) show that 
Judicial is negatively associated with both the cost of index funds and the level of closet 
                                                 
21 Approval is the sum of two dummy variables: (1) whether regulatory approval is required to start a fund and (2) 
whether the prospectus requires regulatory approval. Judicial is the sum of five variables (all variables are scaled 
between 0 and 10): the efficiency of the judicial system, rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation, and risk of 
contract repudiation.  
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indexing in a country.  
We also examine the characteristics of a country’s fund industry (Fund industry size, Fund 
industry Herfindahl) and level of economic development (GDP per capita). Columns (2), (4) and 
(6) show that industry size is significantly related to the amount of indexing, both explicit and 
closet indexing: when the fund industry is larger, the higher is the market share of explicitly 
indexed funds, the lower is the cost, and the less widespread is closet indexing. These results are 
consistent with the argument that industry development and economies of scale make it easier for 
low-cost explicitly indexed products to be offered and, at the same time, for closet indexing by 
active funds to be mitigated. Our argument is that this mitigation is due to changes in the 
competitive environment caused by the increased presence of explicitly indexed funds.  
We also run our regressions with all variables calculated by country of sale. The results 
reported in Panel B of Table 2 are consistent with those in Panel A.22  
5. Explicitly Indexed Funds and Active Funds 
In this section, we study the relation between explicit indexing in a market and the product 
differentiation (active share) and price that investors pay for active management (total 
shareholder costs). Specifically, for investors primarily interested in achieving exposure to beta, 
explicitly indexed funds are low-cost substitutes to the more expensive actively managed funds. 
If indexed funds create competitive pressure, then we expect active funds facing higher market 
penetration by indexed products to differentiate themselves by more actively deviating from their 
benchmarks through stock picking, sector bets, and market timing or by lowering their prices 
(fees). In alternative, actives funds’ behavior may not be affected by indexed funds. 
                                                 
22 In Table IA.6 of the Internet Appendix, we show that results are robust when we further refine the analysis by 
measuring explicit and closet indexing separately by benchmark type (world, regional, country-domestic, and 
country-foreign) in each country. 
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Previous research on mutual fund competition in the United States has arrived at diverse 
conclusions regarding whether index funds are commodities and should be selling for the same 
price (e.g., Elton, Gruber, and Busse, 2004; Hortacsu and Syverson, 2004; Collins, 2005). 
Researchers have also debated whether the U.S. mutual fund industry as a whole is competitive 
(e.g., Coates and Hubbard, 2007; Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu, 2009; Wahal and Wang, 2011; 
Khorana and Servaes, 2012). Our hypotheses focus on the effects of the entry of low-cost passive 
investment vehicles on the fund industry competitive environment in changes to active funds’ 
product differentiation and fees. 
5.1. Product Differentiation 
To test our hypothesis, we estimate panel regressions using the sample of active equity funds. 
The dependent variable is the yearly fund-level active share whereas the main explanatory 
variables are the market share and TNA-weighted average total shareholder costs (TSC) of 
explicitly indexed funds located in the same country as the fund. We control for fund 
characteristics, dummies for particular types of funds (international, fund of fund, off-shore), 
country characteristics and year dummies, and we cluster standard errors by country-year.23 
Importantly, the regressions also include fund benchmark dummies, which control for any 
unobserved (time invariant) heterogeneity in portfolio management across different benchmarks.  
Table 3 presents the results. Columns (1) and (2) show the results when we measure the 
indexing variables by country of domicile. Columns (3) and (4) show the results using the 
individual share class offered for sale in a given country and year as a unit of observation and we 
measure indexing variables (and other country variables) by country of sale and year.24  
                                                 
23 We obtain similar estimates when we use two-way cluster standard errors by country and by year. 
24 This set up takes into account that a fund can be offered for sale in multiple countries. A fund with two share 
classes, each offered for sale in three countries, will have six different observations per year in this sample. In these 
tests, fund-level variables are measured at the individual share class level, and country-level variables are measured 
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In columns (1) and (3) we examine the relation between product differentiation by active 
funds and the relative prominence of explicitly indexed funds. Although in the analysis using 
country of domicile we do not find this relation to be significant, in the country of sale analysis 
shown in column (3) we find that active funds tend to have higher active shares in countries in 
which explicitly indexed funds have higher market share. Further consistent with our hypothesis, 
columns (2) and (4) show that the coefficient on the average TSC of explicitly indexed funds is 
negative and significant. These results suggest that funds tend to engage in more active 
management in markets where they face more competitive pressure from explicitly indexed 
funds. The effects are economically meaningful, as we find that a one standard deviation increase 
in the average TSC of passive funds (0.53) in a country is associated with a decrease in average 
active share of 1.5 percentage points using the estimate in column (2).  
Overall, the tests in Table 3 are consistent with the hypothesis that active fund managers 
perceive low-cost explicitly indexed funds as a competitive threat. These results also provide 
additional insights into the organization of mutual fund markets. For example, we find that funds 
are more active in larger fund markets and countries with higher judicial quality. Further, active 
shares are higher for funds with higher tracking error (i.e., volatility of the difference between a 
portfolio return and its benchmark index return), higher TSC, younger funds, and those affiliated 
to smaller fund families. Moreover, we find that fund managers who have been more successful 
in the past (in terms of performance and attracting flows) have higher active shares. These results 
for our international sample of mutual funds are in line with those in Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009) for U.S. equity mutual funds.  
The active share regression results in Table 3 are robust to a number of specification checks. 
                                                                                                                                                             
by the country of sale. In particular, the indexing variables (market share and cost of explicitly indexed funds and 
the market share of closet indexers) are measured by country of sale. 
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In Table IA.7 of the Internet Appendix we estimate the regression using the sample of non-U.S. 
funds to alleviate any concerns that results are driven by the fact that funds domiciled in the 
United States represent a large fraction of the observations. We also consider alternative methods 
to estimate a fund’s active share. In particular, we calculate the proportion of a fund’s portfolio 
holdings that differ from the aggregate stock portfolio of active funds that track a fund’s 
benchmark, in the spirit of the overlap measure of Wahal and Wang (2011).25 Additionally, we 
estimate the regression model using weighted least squares, where the total net assets of the fund 
are employed as the weights and estimate regressions using country fixed effects. Finally, we 
measure the indexing variables for each country and benchmark type, and consider only the 
sample of domestic funds.  
If fund managers react to the competitive threat of explicitly indexed funds by increasing 
their active share, then an implication is that they expect higher fund flows from such actions. 
We test this implication by examining whether mutual funds that offer more distinct portfolios 
(as proxied by higher active share) attract greater flows. We measure net flows at the annual 
frequency as the net growth in total net assets (TNA), following the method in Sirri and Tufano 
(1998). We estimate regression of net flows on prior year active share and fund-level control 
variables shown in previous research to be related to flows such as prior year TNA, age, TSC, 
and tracking error (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Del Guercio and Tkac, 2002). The regressions 
also include year and benchmark dummies and standard errors are clustered by country-year.  
The relation between flows and active share is likely to be influenced by a fund’s past 
performance, thus, we include an interaction term between active share and the return quintile 
                                                 
25 We also use two alternative methods to calculate active share: (1) we construct the index weights based only on 
ETFs that engage in full physical replication of the indices (SPDR or iShares ETFs); (2) we assign benchmarks 
ourselves, taking the most representative benchmark every year for a fund, based on the one against which it has the 
lowest active share. More details are provided in the Internet Appendix. 
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ranking of the fund. Following Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Wahal and Wang (2011), the return 
rank variable is defined as zero for funds in the bottom quintile of performance (over the prior 12 
months), one for funds in the middle 60%, and two for funds in the top 20%. The return quintile 
rankings rely on benchmark-adjusted returns (columns (1) and (3)) or benchmark-adjusted four-
factor alphas (columns (2) and (4)) as measures of fund performance. The benchmark-adjusted 
return is the difference between the fund’s net return and the return on its benchmark (see 
Section 6 below for details on performance measures). Funds are sorted within each country-
benchmark segment to determine the rankings.     
Table 4 presents the estimates of these regressions. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimates 
by country of domicile and columns (3) and (4) by country of sale. We find that funds with 
higher active share attract more flows and the effect is even more pronounced among funds that 
rank high in the performance rankings. The effects are both statistically and economically 
significant. For example, for a fund in the bottom quintile of performance, the coefficient in 
column (2) implies that a one-standard deviation increase in active share is associated with 2.7% 
higher flows. The results are robust to changing the performance measure and to whether the unit 
of observation is defined by country of domicile or country of sale. 
5.2. Total Shareholder Costs 
We next test the hypothesis that actively managed fund managers tend to charge (or not) 
lower fees when they face more competition from (low-cost) explicitly indexed funds. To test 
this hypothesis, we estimate panel regressions of yearly fund-level total shareholder costs (TSC) 
using the sample of active funds. The main explanatory variables are the country-level 
prevalence and average cost of explicit indexing in the country in which the fund is domiciled or 
offered for sale. We include fund-level active share as a determinant of the TSC, as well as the 
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same fund and country characteristics used in Table 3. Regressions also include year and fund 
benchmark dummies and standard errors are clustered by country-year.  
Table 5 presents the results by country of domicile in columns (1)-(3) and by country of sale 
in columns (4)-(6). We find that the TSC charged by active funds are higher in countries where 
explicitly indexed funds have less market share and are more expensive. The effect of the market 
share of explicitly indexed funds is statistically significant only when we define the indexing 
variable by country of sale in column (4). The effect of the cost of explicitly indexed funds is 
statistically significant in both columns (2) and (5). The estimates in column (2) show that a 
decline in the average TSC of indexed funds of 50 basis points (the difference in TSC between 
U.S. and non-U.S. funds) is associated with 16 basis point lower fees charged by active funds. 
Overall, the results suggest that investors pay a higher price for active funds in markets where 
explicitly indexed products exert less competitive pressure. 
Columns (3) and (6) of Table 5 show that active fund fees are higher in markets where closet 
indexing is more pervasive. According to estimates in column (3), an increase in the level of 
closet indexing of 15 percentage points (the difference between the United States and the rest of 
the world) is associated with an increase in the funds’ TSC of about 4 basis points. This indicates 
that closet indexing reflects a less competitive fund industry in which funds extract higher fees. 
We additionally find that fund characteristics matter for a fund’s total shareholder costs. 
Higher active share, higher tracking error, smaller and older funds are associated with greater 
fees. Consistent with the evidence in Khorana, Servaes and Tufano (2009), fees are lower in 
stronger regulatory environments and when fund industries are larger.26  
                                                 
26 We subject these TSC regressions to a number of robustness checks. In Table IA.8 of the Internet Appendix we 
consider the sample of non-U.S. funds, as well as alternative measures of active share, weighted least squares, 
country fixed effect, analysis by country-benchmark type, and restricting the sample to domestic funds. We 




A potential concern with our findings is endogeneity, that is, the active share and fees 
charged by active funds are likely jointly determined with the market share and cost of explicitly 
indexed funds (and closet indexers). So far, we have used funds’ benchmarks or country fixed 
effects to address the concern that the availability of explicit indexing might be related to some 
unobserved (time invariant) benchmark or country characteristic that explains the active share 
and fees of active funds.  
In this section, we consider a quasi-natural experiment to identify the causal effects of 
indexed funds on the behavior of active funds. We explore the exogenous variation in 
competitive pressure from explicitly indexed funds that results from the staggered passage of 
pension legislation in a fund’s country. We argue that the shift observed in many countries 
towards defined contribution (DC) pension system has contributed to the rise of index funds and 
ETFs. In fact, the Pension Acts generally include policy changes designed to increase market 
competition such as providing investors’ easy access to low-cost funds. One example is in the 
United Kingdom which allowed workers to opt out of the occupational pension plan of their 
employers and created the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST). According to The 
Economist (2014), “(…) As part of a plan to nudge people into taking out private pensions, 
known as auto-enrolment, the British government set up a collective scheme called NEST, with 
annual fees that equate to just 0.5%. Such measures make it likely that more investments will 
flow into tracker funds.”  
The key assumption of our identification strategy is that pension reforms are not related to 
the conditions of the mutual fund industry in each country, other than through changes in the 
availability of explicitly indexed funds. For example, these Pension Acts help us to avoid the 




endogeneity problem to the extent that their timing is a result of the legislative agenda in the 
various countries, rather than driven by particular countries’ fund industry conditions. According 
to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011) (OECD) population 
aging and the fiscal sustainability of public systems have been the main driving forces behind 
pension reforms. For the last two decades, the pension framework has changed from mostly 
defined-benefit plans (either public retirement or employer-provided private pension plans) to 
private defined-contribution plans in which the investment and longevity risk are borne by plan 
participants rather than governments or employers.  
Media coverage at the times of the legislative changes illustrates this. For example, shortly 
before the 2001 legislative change in Japan, the Economist Intelligence Unit discusses the size of 
the Japanese pension market, the country’s aging trend and the government’s plans for reform to 
solve these problems: “As part of a long-term solution, the government plans to introduce a 
defined-contribution pension scheme that would pay benefits based on investment returns.”27 
Similarly, the discussion in the press about Norway’s reforms also focused on the changing 
demographics and the need for change, “Norway’s Parliament is set to vote on legislation aimed 
at securing the future of the pension system during a time of demographic change. At its core, 
the bill transfers part of the cost of pensions from the state system to employers.”28 
We collect the year of the passage of the Pension Act for each country from the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (2009). Table IA.2 in the Internet Appendix 
provides the year of the Pension Act passage in each country.29 We restrict the sample to 
countries that passed the Pension Act in the 1990s or 2000s. We first check whether the passage 
                                                 
27 See Economist Intelligence Unit (1999). 
28 Wall Street Journal (2005). 




of a Pension Act in a country appears to be associated with increased competition for active 
funds due to changes to the market share and cost of explicitly indexed funds. Panels A and B of 
Fig. 4 display the evolution of the market share and the average TSC of explicitly indexed funds, 
respectively, around the passage of the Pension Act (between year -1 and year 0) for the 
treatment group (i.e., countries that passed a pension act in year t) and the control group (i.e., 
countries that did not pass a pension act in year t). The market share of explicitly indexed funds 
in the treatment group increases from 5.5% three years prior to the event to about 9% three years 
after the event. In parallel, the average TSC of explicitly indexed funds in the treatment group 
decreases from about 1% three years before the event to about 0.85% three years after the event. 
In contrast, the market share and average TSC of indexed funds in a country that did not pass a 
pension act in that year do not show significant changes in the year of the Pension Act passage. 
These findings suggest that Pension Act legislation is associated with increased availability of 
low-cost passive investment alternatives.  
We next examine the corresponding response of actively managed funds by comparing the 
outcomes in each country that passed a Pension Act in the years before versus the years after 
passage. We use the group of countries without pension legislative changes over that year to 
control for changes in fund industry conditions in a regression framework. As a result, we 
compare the differences in outcome variables in the treatment group of countries before and after 
the year of the Pension Act passage to the differences in those variables for the control group of 
countries over the same period. These differences in differences provide estimates of how the 
passage of Pension Acts affected the decisions of the active funds located in the country. The 
regression accounts for the fact that there are many Pension Acts staggered over time. Because 
the regression implicitly takes all countries not passing an Act at time t as a control group, even 
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if they already passed an Act or will pass one later on, it accounts for the fact that the passage of 
the Pension Acts is staggered over time. The regressions also include year dummies to control 
for aggregate changes in stock markets and the fund industry.    
Table 6 reports the estimates from the differences-in-differences regressions where the 
dependent variables are the active share (columns (1)-(3)) and total shareholder cost (columns 
(4)-(6)) of active funds. Again we report two sets of results. Panel A reports estimates by country 
of domicile, and Panel B reports estimates by country of sale. The explanatory variable of 
interest is the Post pension act (year >=0), a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a 
Pension Act has been passed in the fund’s country by year t. Thus, the coefficient on the Post 
pension act (year >=0) variable estimates the impact of the Pension Act on the active share and 
TSC. The regression controls for time invariant differences between funds in the treatment 
versus the control groups through fund fixed effects.  
Column (1) in Panels A and B report the estimated impact of the passage of a Pension Act on 
the active share of active funds in that country. On average, in the years after the act is passed, 
funds increase their active shares by 1.3% for the country of domicile analysis in Panel A and 
1.5% to 2% for the country of sale analysis in Panel B. The coefficients are statistically 
significant. In column (2) in both panels, we show that the active share effect of the acts remains 
robust to the inclusion of time-varying fund controls such as TNA, age, and flows.  
In column (3), we provide further evidence regarding the potential issues of reverse causality 
and industry-level confounding effects and specifically to what extent any pre-existing trends are 
present in the years before the Pension Acts were passed. Specifically, we replace the Post 
pension act dummy variable with four dummy variables: Pre pension act (-3<= year <=-1) is a 
dummy variable that equals one if a fund’s country passes a pension act in three years, two years 
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or one year; Post pension act (year 0) is a dummy variable that equals one if a fund’s country 
passes a pension act in the current year; Post pension act (year 1) is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a fund’s country passed a pension act in the previous year; and Post pension act 
(year >=2) is a dummy variable that equals one if a fund’s country passed a pension act two 
years ago or more. The variable Pre pension act (-3<= year <=-1) allow us to evaluate whether 
an effect on funds’ active shares can be found prior to the passage of the Pension Act, which 
could indicate some reverse causality. We find that the coefficient on Pre pension act (-3<= year 
<=-1) is statistically insignificant, while we find that the coefficients on Post pension act (year 0) 
and Post pension act (year 1) and Post pension act (year >=2) are positive and significant. 
Further, the Post pension act (year 1) and Post pension act (year >=2) coefficients are 
economically larger than that on Pension act (year 0), which is consistent with a causal 
interpretation of the effect of the passage of the Pension Act on active share. 
Columns (4)-(6) in Panels A and B present estimates of similar specifications for the TSC of 
active funds by country of domicile and sale. In both cases, we find that subsequent to the act 
being passed, the active funds reduce the TSC by 3 to 5 basis points, reductions that are 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Further, the coefficient on Pre pension act (-3<= year <=-
1) is statistically insignificant, while the coefficients on Post pension act (year 1) and Post 
pension act (year >=2) are economically larger than that on Pension act (year 0). These results 
are consistent with Pension Acts having causal effects on shareholder costs and they rule out the 
existence of pre-trends.  
Given the concern that pre-trends might exist in the outcome variables (active share and TSC 
of active funds) for the treatment group relative to the control group, Fig. 5 plots the coefficients 
on these variables equivalent to those in columns (3) and (6) in Table 6, Panel B, but including 
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yearly leads and lags of the Post pension act dummy variable. Panel A presents estimates in 
which the dependent variable is the active share, and Panel B presents estimates in which the 
dependent variable is the TSC of active funds. Both panels show no differentials in the trends 
between the treated and control groups prior to the Pension Act passages, but sharp differences 
emerge after the Pension Act legislation.  
We conduct other sensitivity tests of our differences-in-differences estimates. First, we report 
the results of tests of changes in fund industry conditions (industry concentration) that could 
correlate with the outcome variables in column (7) of Panels A and B. These results show no 
statistically significant differences in the periods before and after the passage of the Pension 
Acts. Second, we perform placebo tests using countries that have not approved a Pension Act as 
a fictitious treatment group and randomly assigning them years in which a Pension Act was 
approved (i.e., a year between 2002 and 2007). The results show no statistical significant effects 
in the outcomes variables. Finally, we implement an instrumental variables approach as another 
way to address the potential endogeneity in our original tests, using the financial sophistication 
of retail investors in a country and the development of the DC pension market as instruments. 
The results in Tables IA.9 and IA.10 of the Internet Appendix are consistent with those in Tables 
3 and 5. Overall, the results of all these sensitivity tests support the interpretation of a causal 
effect of explicitly indexed funds on active funds. 
6. Returns to Active Management 
In this section, we test whether investors benefit from the changing fund industry dynamics. 
That is, we examine whether performance from investing in truly active funds improves as 
competition from explicit index funds increases. We first examine benchmark-adjusted returns 
(i.e., the difference between the fund’s net return and the return on its benchmark). The average 
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benchmark-adjusted net return for all active funds in our sample is approximately zero, 
consistent with results in other studies of mutual fund performance and also consistent with the 
Berk and Green (2004) theory of active fund management. We find that truly active funds 
significantly outperform closet indexers. Further, we find that the truly active funds are able to 
outperform their benchmarks on average by 1.04% per year (0.12% if equal-weighting). 
We next examine whether active share predicts future fund performance using benchmark-
adjusted four-factor alphas as our measure of performance. The four-factor alphas are estimated 
using three years of past monthly fund (benchmark-adjusted) returns with regional factors (Asia, 
Europe, North America, and Emerging Markets) or world factors in the case of world funds in 
the manner of Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009). Ferreira, Keswani, Miguel, and Ramos 
(2013) provide details on the construction of the factors. We then subtract the expected return 
from the realized fund return to estimate the fund abnormal return (alpha) in each year, which is 
measured as the sum of the intercept of the model and the residual as in Carhart (1997). We then 
regress four-factor alphas on active share and fund and country characteristics in pooled 
regressions. All independent variables are measured with a one-year lag. The regressions also 
include benchmark and year dummies, and standard errors are clustered by country-year.  
Table 7 reports the results. Panel A reports estimates when indexing variables and other 
country variables are measured by country of domicile, while Panel B reports estimates when 
these variables are measured by country of sale and the unit of observation is a fund share class 
offered for sale in each country. Column (1) shows that funds with higher active share perform 
better. Thus, active share is a predictor of future fund performance across world markets, 
consistent with the Cremers and Petajisto (2009) results for U.S. equity mutual funds. The effect 
of active share on future fund performance is both statistically and economically significant. A 
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one standard deviation increase in active share is associated with a 0.7% increase in four-factor 
alphas in the subsequent year using the estimate in column (1), Panel A.  
Table 7 also shows that tracking error (an alternative measure of active management) is 
actually negatively related to future fund performance. This suggests that the market rewards 
funds that are most active in stock picking (which is captured by active share) but does not 
reward factor bets (which is captured by tracking error). The coefficients of the other fund 
characteristics are consistent with previous findings for the U.S. mutual fund literature. Fund size 
is negatively related to performance, while family size is positively related (Chen, Hong, Huang, 
and Kubik, 2004). Total shareholder costs are negatively related to performance (Malkiel, 1995; 
Carhart, 1997; and Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu, 2009).  
Table IA.11 in the Internet Appendix shows that estimates are consistent using different fund 
performance measures commonly used in the literature (benchmark-adjusted returns, excess 
return four-factor alphas, and information ratio). For example, we estimate that a one standard 
deviation increase in active share is associated with a 1% increase in future benchmark-adjusted 
returns. Table IA.11 also shows that funds with higher active share perform better using the 
sample of non-U.S. funds, weighted least squares, country fixed effects, the sample of domestic 
funds, alternative active share measures (the pure-ETF active share and the minimum active 
share), and controlling for the Amihud and Goyenko (2013) R-squared measure.  
We next test the hypothesis that the presence of passive funds affects the returns to active 
management. To test this, in the performance regressions we include the market shares and 
average cost of explicit indexing and closet indexing and the interactions of these variables with 
a fund’s active share. Columns (2)-(4) of Table 7 present the estimates of these regressions. We 
find that fund performance is positively related to the market share of explicitly indexed funds in 
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column (2) of Panel B and negatively related to the average cost of explicit indexing in column 
(3) in both Panels A and B. It suggests that active funds perform better in markets where low-
cost explicitly indexed funds are more available. This finding is consistent with the idea that 
enhanced competition by low-cost explicitly indexed funds spurs active funds to deliver better 
after-fee performance to investors. Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction between active 
share and the market share of explicitly indexed funds is negative and significant (in Panel B) 
and the interaction of active share and the average TSC of explicitly index funds is positive and 
significant (in both Panels A and B). We thus conclude that the marginal returns to active 
management are lower in markets with more prevalent and cheaper explicitly indexed funds.  
The coefficient on the market share of closet indexing is negative and significant in column 
(4) of Panel B, while the interaction term with active share is positive and significant. These 
findings suggest that funds perform worse in markets in which so-called active funds are actually 
more generally passive with a consequent less competitive environment.  
Finally, we examine the implication that the pension legislation should have resulted in 
changes in active fund performance by extending the differences-in-differences analysis. The 
results, reported in Table IA.12 of the Internet Appendix, show that the coefficient on the Post 
pension act (year >=0) variable is positive and significant, which indicates that performance 
improves more for the treatment group funds than for the control group funds following the 
passage of the Pension Act. These results are consistent with those reported in Table 7. 
7. Conclusion 
We examine the consequences of indexing in the equity mutual fund industry across 32 
countries. We test the hypothesis that growth in explicit indexing affects the competitive 
structure of mutual fund markets by forcing actively managed mutual funds to increase their 
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active share (deviate more from the benchmark) and to lower their fees. Our evidence is 
consistent with this hypothesis. Markets with more competition from explicitly indexed funds 
display active funds that pursue more differentiated product strategies (i.e., funds exhibit higher 
active shares) to deliver alpha to investors and charge lower fees for active management. In 
contrast, in countries in which investors have limited options of paying lower fees for beta 
exposure through passive management, many active fund managers are effectively closet 
indexers who charge higher fees and underperform. A quasi-natural experiment using the 
exogenous variation in the availability of indexed funds generated by the country adoption of 
defined-contribution pension systems supports a causal interpretation of the results. 
The primary implication of these results is that the growth of explicitly indexed funds 
worldwide enhances competition in the asset management industry. Further, the continued 
growth of index-based investing could have broader implications for markets and asset prices, 
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Explicit and closet indexing by country of domicile and country of sale 
This table presents the number of funds and TNA in billions of U.S. dollars per country as of December 2010 for the sample of open-end equity mutual funds in Lipper for 
which holdings are available in LionShares. Explicit indexing includes index funds and exchange-traded funds. Closet indexing includes active funds with active share below 0.6. 
Truly active includes active funds with active share above 0.6. Total shareholder cost is the annual total expense ratio plus one-fifth of the front-end load. Panel A presents 
statistics based on the primary fund country of domicile and Panel B presents statistics based on the fund share class country of sale.  
Panel A: By country of domicile 
 Funds with holdings  Explicitly indexed funds Active funds Market share (% TNA)  Total shareholder cost (%) 
 Number 
TNA 
($ billion)  Number 
TNA 















Austria 167 15.0  11 0.5 156 14.5 3 36 61 2.23 2.58 2.61
Belgium 150 17.9  24 3.7 126 14.2 21 43 36 1.16 2.01 1.98
Canada 895 326.4  53 24.4 842 302.0 8 37 55 0.42 2.11 2.80
Denmark 201 30.5  12 0.5 189 30.0 2 27 71 0.83 1.87 2.09
Finland 147 26.2  8 0.8 139 25.4 3 44 53 0.34 2.16 1.91
France 492 134.1  89 33.8 403 100.3 25 29 46 0.77 2.07 2.22
Germany 356 139.5  51 22.3 305 117.2 16 34 50 0.69 2.34 2.37
Ireland 484 222.5  62 68.8 422 153.7 31 25 44 0.56 1.89 2.17
Italy 125 31.4  0 0.0 125 31.4 0 36 64 2.44 2.59
Liechtenstein 101 6.0  0 0.0 101 6.0 0 18 82 1.70 1.98
Luxembourg 2,057 750.5  107 30.7 1,950 719.8 4 26 70 1.21 2.60 2.43
Netherlands 75 33.6  3 0.3 72 33.3 1 21 78 0.59 1.40 1.30
Norway 117 41.4  8 2.6 109 38.8 6 26 68 0.42 1.44 1.82
Poland 46 8.4  0 0.0 46 8.4 0 58 42 4.02 3.00
Portugal 53 2.0  1 0.0 52 2.0 0 39 61 1.03 2.01 2.08
Spain 267 13.1  27 1.2 240 11.9 9 42 49 1.51 2.12 1.97
Sweden 266 113.5  36 11.7 230 101.8 10 56 34 0.56 1.47 1.42
Switzerland 220 69.7  45 40.6 175 29.1 58 24 18 1.01 1.73 2.08
United Kingdom 975 504.1  46 45.6 929 458.5 9 32 59 0.62 2.33 2.38
United States 3,153 5,150.3  547 1,393.2 2,606 3,757.1 27 15 58 0.26 1.07 1.31
Asia Pacific 1,204 255.5  86 62.3 1,118 193.2 24 20 56 0.75 1.46 1.90
Other Regions 225 29.3  2 0.1 223 29.2 0 41 59 1.35 2.14 2.08
  





Table 1 (continued) 
Panel B: By country of sale 
 Funds with holdings  Explicitly indexed funds Active funds Market share (% TNA)  Total shareholder cost (%) 
 Number 
TNA 
($ billion)  Number 
TNA 















Austria 5,861 1,020  269 114.9 5,592 904.9 11 24 65 0.76 2.61 2.53
Belgium 3,301 519  154 20.9 3,147 498.1 4 27 69 0.90 2.82 2.74
Canada 2,114 326  82 24.3 2,032 302.1 7 37 55 0.41 2.11 2.78
Denmark 2,741 476  65 55.8 2,676 420.6 12 26 62 0.53 2.65 2.58
Finland 3,973 582  115 35.9 3,858 545.8 6 28 66 0.88 2.67 2.56
France 6,269 1,024  370 137.7 5,899 886.7 13 24 62 0.68 2.54 2.53
Germany 7,360 1,186  399 149.5 6,961 1,036.1 13 24 63 0.71 2.53 2.48
Ireland 2,846 595  156 87.9 2,690 507.4 15 24 62 0.63 2.48 2.49
Italy 4,359 706  189 51 4,170 654.9 7 27 66 0.84 2.69 2.62
Liechtenstein 60 1  8 0.0 52 1.3 0 31 69 1.61 2.59 2.54
Luxembourg 7,485 1,048  355 125.2 7,130 922.6 12 24 64 0.77 2.58 2.43
Netherlands 5,194 900  267 134.8 4,927 765.1 15 22 63 0.63 2.58 2.49
Norway 3,324 482  40 7.6 3,284 474.7 2 31 68 0.70 2.55 2.59
Poland 1,755 233  0 0.0 1,755 233.0 0 30 70 2.84 2.64
Portugal 3,390 440  90 7.5 3,300 432.6 2 30 68 1.45 2.71 2.70
Spain 5,359 806  215 84.7 5,144 721.1 11 25 64 0.69 2.66 2.57
Sweden 5,311 856  248 96.1 5,063 760.0 11 27 62 0.72 2.30 2.43
Switzerland 6,809 1,106  387 170.9 6,422 934.6 15 21 63 0.78 2.55 2.46
United Kingdom 6,924 1,307  329 161.8 6,595 1,145.5 12 26 62 0.65 2.47 2.42
United States 8,976 5,079  918 1,392.1 8,058 3,686.6 27 15 58 0.25 1.09 1.32
Asia Pacific 8,675 2,103  220 520.6 8,455 1,582.5 25 18 57 0.31 2.63 2.61
Other Regions 542 163  3 0.1 539 163.1 0 25 75 1.36 2.64 2.80
Other Countries 21,294 5,661  692 1,457.2 20,602 4,203.3 26 22 52 0.28 2.34 2.49
    








Determinants of explicit and closet indexing at country level 
This table presents estimates of yearly country-level regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage that 
explicitly indexed funds represent of the TNA in a country (Explicit indexing (% TNA)), the TNA-weighted average total 
shareholder cost of explicitly indexed funds in a country (Explicit indexing (average TSC)), and the percentage that active funds 
with active share measure below 0.6 represent of the TNA in a country (Closet indexing (% TNA)). The sample includes open-
end equity mutual funds taken from Lipper for which holdings are available in LionShares from 2002 to 2010. In Panel A the unit 
of observation is a country of domicile j in year t. In Panel B the unit of observation is a country of sale k in year t. Regressions 
include year dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Panel A: By country of domicile 
 
Explicit indexing  
(% TNA) 
Explicit indexing  
(average TSC) 
Closet indexing  
(% TNA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Approval 0.0575** 0.1174 -0.0099 
(2.51) (1.54) (-0.40) 
Judicial 0.0041** -0.0245*** -0.0063*** 
(2.44) (-4.27) (-3.53) 
Fund industry size (log) 0.0298*** -0.0833*** -0.0330*** 
(3.38) (-2.77) (-3.52) 
Fund industry Herfindahl 0.8183*** 0.1241 -0.0335 
(4.28) (0.20) (-0.16) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.0024 -0.0603 -0.0160 
(-0.17) (-1.39) (-1.09) 
       
Observations 259 250 212 212 258 249 
R-squared 0.066 0.104 0.110 0.125 0.156 0.205 
Panel B: By country of sale 
 
Explicit indexing  
(% TNA) 
Explicit indexing  
(average TSC) 
Closet indexing  
(% TNA) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Approval 0.1098***  -0.0223  -0.0009  
 (4.69)  (-0.38)  (-0.06)  
Judicial 0.0051***  -0.0244***  -0.0045***  
 (2.87)  (-5.21)  (-4.17)  
Fund industry size (log)  0.0360***  -0.0922***  -0.0151*** 
  (4.14)  (-4.50)  (-2.88) 
Fund industry Herfindahl  0.2874**  0.2181  -0.2013*** 
  (2.49)  (0.63)  (-2.89) 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.0037  -0.1061***  -0.0123 
  (-0.26)  (-3.26)  (-1.42) 
       
Observations 254 254 240 240 254 254 








Determinants of active management 
This table presents estimates of panel regressions where the dependent variable is a fund’s active share at year-end, defined 
as the percentage of a fund’s portfolio holdings that differs from the fund’s benchmark. The sample includes open-end active 
equity mutual funds taken from Lipper for which holdings are available in LionShares from 2002 to 2010. In columns (1) and (2) 
the unit of observation is a fund’s primary share class i domiciled in country j in year t. In columns (3) and (4) the unit of 
observation is a fund share class s offered for sale in country k in year t. Regressions include year and benchmark dummies. Refer 
to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics clustered by country of domicile-year (columns (1) and (2)) or country 
of sale-year (columns (3) and (4)) are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 By country of domicile By country of sale 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA) 0.0075 0.0171**  
(0.47) (2.38)  
Explicit indexing (average TSC) -0.0290***  -0.0128*** 
(-4.90)  (-4.33) 
Tracking error 1.6678*** 1.6470*** 1.6039*** 1.6056*** 
(7.47) (7.16) (14.09) (13.81) 
Total shareholder cost 0.0266*** 0.0285*** 0.0153*** 0.0153*** 
(15.43) (15.71) (21.00) (20.52) 
Total net assets (log) -0.0057*** -0.0053*** 0.0003** 0.0003** 
(-10.87) (-10.16) (2.37) (2.38) 
Family total net assets (log) -0.0039*** -0.0044*** -0.0067*** -0.0068*** 
(-5.06) (-5.55) (-18.84) (-18.90) 
Fund age -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0010*** -0.0010*** 
(-5.55) (-5.38) (-8.93) (-8.87) 
Flows 0.0079*** 0.0083*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
(6.69) (7.05) (8.19) (8.22) 
Benchmark-adjusted return 0.1414*** 0.1386*** 0.1645*** 0.1643*** 
(5.87) (5.64) (11.69) (11.52) 
International fund dummy -0.0201*** -0.0166*** -0.0354*** -0.0349*** 
(-4.02) (-3.18) (-5.18) (-5.20) 
Fund of fund dummy 0.0399*** 0.0451*** 0.0409*** 0.0412*** 
(4.58) (5.01) (7.97) (8.02) 
Off-shore fund dummy 0.0342*** 0.0620*** 0.0120*** 0.0120*** 
(2.86) (4.26) (6.31) (6.35) 
Approval 0.0087** 0.0151*** -0.0025** -0.0026** 
(1.98) (3.14) (-2.05) (-2.08) 
Judicial 0.0026*** 0.0024*** 0.0006*** 0.0004** 
(4.70) (3.92) (4.89) (2.48) 
Fund industry size (log) 0.0081*** 0.0046** 0.0024*** 0.0020*** 
(5.20) (2.50) (3.74) (3.23) 
Fund industry Herfindahl -0.2466*** -0.2122*** -0.0030 0.0106 
(-6.31) (-6.00) (-0.36) (0.96) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.0352*** -0.0388*** -0.0152*** -0.0165*** 
(-7.80) (-8.56) (-7.10) (-6.73) 
  
Observations 58,487 56,554 423,103 415,797 





Fund flows and active management 
This table presents estimates of panel regressions where the dependent variable is a fund’s yearly net flows, defined as new 
external money growth as percentage of TNA. Return rank is equal to zero for funds in the bottom 20% of performance 
(benchmark-adjusted return or four-factor alpha over the prior 12 months), one for funds in the middle 60%, and two for funds in 
the top 20%. The sample includes open-end active equity mutual funds taken from Lipper for which holdings are available in 
LionShares from 2002 to 2010. In columns (1)-(2) the unit of observation is a fund’s primary share class i domiciled in country j 
in year t. In columns (3)-(4) the unit of observation is a fund share class s offered for sale in country k in year t. Regressions 
include year and benchmark dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics clustered by country of 
domicile-year (columns (1)-(2)) or country of sale-year (columns (3)-(4)) are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** reflects 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
  By country of domicile   By country of sale 









  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Active share 0.0865* 0.1218*** 0.3782*** 0.3648*** 
(1.89) (2.82) (11.91) (11.95) 
Return rank 0.0250 0.0224 0.0695*** 0.0211** 
(1.20) (1.23) (4.91) (1.97) 
Active share  Return rank 0.1408*** 0.1166*** 0.1349*** 0.1500*** 
(4.17) (4.21) (6.68) (8.76) 
Tracking error 0.1573 0.1462* 0.6609*** 0.5904*** 
(1.55) (1.70) (4.67) (4.85) 
Total shareholder cost -0.0256*** -0.0254*** -0.0506*** -0.0520*** 
(-4.07) (-3.97) (-10.33) (-9.93) 
Total net assets (log) -0.0804*** -0.0764*** -0.1199*** -0.1146*** 
(-14.54) (-14.38) (-23.95) (-23.68) 
Family total net assets (log) 0.0250*** 0.0238*** 0.0597*** 0.0581*** 
(6.69) (6.27) (15.16) (14.80) 
Fund age -0.0030*** -0.0024*** -0.0056*** -0.0032*** 
(-7.78) (-6.03) (-15.03) (-9.44) 
International fund dummy 0.0176 0.0203 0.0573*** 0.0675*** 
(0.84) (0.95) (2.70) (3.13) 
Fund of fund dummy -0.0749*** -0.0677*** -0.0953*** -0.0891*** 
(-3.00) (-2.67) (-4.52) (-4.10) 
Off shore fund dummy -0.2038*** -0.1963*** 0.0096 0.0006 
(-3.55) (-3.37) (1.19) (0.07) 
Approval -0.0235 -0.0193 0.0004 0.0015 
(-1.24) (-1.01) (0.08) (0.30) 
Judicial -0.0091*** -0.0088*** 0.0001 -0.0000 
(-3.14) (-2.99) (0.18) (-0.09) 
Fund industry size (log) 0.0167** 0.0164** -0.0109*** -0.0102*** 
(2.05) (1.98) (-4.02) (-3.77) 
Fund industry Herfindahl -0.0585 -0.0564 -0.0177 -0.0026 
(-0.33) (-0.31) (-0.41) (-0.06) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.1166*** 0.1131*** 0.0279*** 0.0263** 
(5.05) (4.82) (2.61) (2.55) 
Observations 52,767 52,767 375,494 375,494 





Determinants of the total shareholder costs of active funds 
This table presents estimates of panel regressions where the dependent variable is a fund’s yearly total shareholder cost, 
defined as total expense ratio plus one-fifth of the front-end load. The sample includes open-end active equity mutual funds taken 
from Lipper for which holdings are available in LionShares from 2002 to 2010. In columns (1)-(3) the unit of observation is a 
fund’s primary share class i domiciled in country j in year t. In columns (4)-(6) the unit of observation is a fund share class s 
offered for sale in country k in year t. Regressions include year and benchmark dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Robust t-statistics clustered by country of domicile-year (columns (1)-(3)) or country of sale-year (columns (4)-(6)) 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 By country of domicile By country of sale 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA) -0.0444 -0.4118***   
(-0.36) (-4.18)   
Explicit indexing (average TSC) 0.3275***  0.1239***  
(7.44)  (5.84)  
Closet indexing (% TNA) 0.2863**   0.3035** 
(2.44)   (2.29) 
Active share 0.6080*** 0.6382*** 0.6192*** 0.5867*** 0.5857*** 0.5892*** 
 (13.96) (14.29) (13.93) (23.96) (23.56) (23.57) 
Tracking error 0.9326*** 1.0024*** 0.9722*** 1.3308*** 1.3261*** 1.3402*** 
(6.31) (6.61) (6.59) (9.87) (10.07) (10.35) 
Total net assets (log) -0.0719*** -0.0752*** -0.0718*** -0.0324*** -0.0327*** -0.0325*** 
(-20.27) (-22.74) (-20.53) (-18.01) (-17.83) (-17.78) 
Family total net assets (log) 0.0146*** 0.0176*** 0.0146*** -0.0106*** -0.0098*** -0.0096*** 
(2.82) (3.40) (2.87) (-5.06) (-4.62) (-4.64) 
Fund age 0.0058*** 0.0052*** 0.0057*** 0.0131*** 0.0130*** 0.0131*** 
(6.89) (6.30) (6.80) (13.18) (12.99) (13.02) 
Flows 0.0055 0.0032 0.0044 -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0019*** 
(0.90) (0.52) (0.72) (-6.59) (-6.51) (-6.51) 
Benchmark-adjusted return -0.2542*** -0.2173*** -0.2480*** -0.5942*** -0.5896*** -0.5969*** 
(-4.04) (-3.55) (-3.97) (-14.02) (-13.87) (-14.09) 
International fund dummy 0.3634*** 0.2973*** 0.3359*** 0.5105*** 0.5256*** 0.5258*** 
(14.99) (10.13) (13.60) (17.25) (19.34) (16.68) 
Fund of fund dummy -0.2490*** -0.2402*** -0.2546*** -0.3911*** -0.3934*** -0.3912*** 
(-6.90) (-6.78) (-7.04) (-13.99) (-13.89) (-13.98) 
Off-shore fund dummy -0.0404 -0.3208*** -0.0319 0.2604*** 0.2611*** 0.2620*** 
(-0.43) (-3.09) (-0.36) (22.04) (21.67) (22.07) 
Approval -0.3734*** -0.4667*** -0.3727*** -0.0010 -0.0046 -0.0056 
(-8.55) (-11.81) (-8.63) (-0.11) (-0.51) (-0.61) 
Judicial -0.0088 -0.0037 -0.0082 -0.0010 0.0006 -0.0016** 
(-1.59) (-0.68) (-1.50) (-1.16) (0.49) (-2.05) 
Fund industry size (log) -0.0537*** 0.0027 -0.0494*** -0.0270*** -0.0254*** -0.0297*** 
(-3.39) (0.16) (-2.96) (-5.59) (-5.29) (-6.05) 
Fund industry Herfindahl -1.5938*** -1.6571*** -1.6930*** -0.0375 -0.1661 0.0310 
(-4.27) (-4.27) (-4.58) (-0.40) (-1.18) (0.32) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.0962** 0.1348*** 0.1140*** 0.0500*** 0.0549*** 0.0469*** 
(2.24) (3.14) (2.73) (2.80) (2.65) (2.61) 
   
Observations 58,487 56,554 58,487 423,103 415,797 423,103 




Differences-in-differences estimates using the Passage of Pension Acts 
This table presents differences-in-differences estimates where the dependent variable is the fund’s active share at year-end 
(columns (1)-(3)), yearly total shareholder cost (columns (4)-(6)), and the fund industry Herfindahl at year-end (column (7)). 
Active share is the percentage of a fund’s portfolio holdings that differs from the fund’s benchmark. Total shareholder cost is 
total expense ratio plus one-fifth of the front-end load. The sample includes open-end active equity mutual funds taken from 
Lipper for which holdings are available in LionShares from 2002 to 2010. In Panel A the unit of observation is a fund’s primary 
share class i domiciled in country j in year t. In Panel B the unit of observation is a fund share class s offered for sale in country k 
in year t. Post pension act (year >=0) is a dummy variable that equals one if a fund’s country has passed a pension act that year or 
earlier. Pre pension act (year -3) is a dummy variable that equals one if a fund’s country will pass a pension act in three years, 
two years or one year. Post pension act (year 0) is a dummy variable that equals one if a fund’s country passes a pension act in 
the current year. Post pension act (year 1+) is a dummy variable that equals one if a fund’s country passed a pension act one year 
ago. Post pension act (year 2+) is a dummy variable that equals one if a fund’s country passed a pension act two years ago or 
more. Regressions include year and fund fixed effects. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics clustered 
by country of domicile-year (Panel A) or country of sale-year (Panel B) are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** reflects 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Panel A: By country of domicile   
 Active share Total shareholder cost 
Fund industry 
Herfindahl 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Post pension act (year >=0) 0.0132* 0.0122*  -0.0519** -0.0361**   
(1.83) (1.86)  (-1.98) (-2.09)   
Pre pension act (-3<= year <=-1)   0.0143   -0.0272 -0.0193 
   (1.22)   (-1.12) (-1.35) 
Post pension act (year 0)   0.0241***   -0.0484** -0.0172 
  (2.79)   (-2.06) (-1.14) 
Post pension act (year 1)   0.0258***   -0.0623** -0.0152 
  (3.10)   (-2.48) (-0.96) 
Post pension act (year >=2)   0.0305***   -0.0692*** -0.0096 
   (3.38)   (-2.74) (-0.58) 
Total net assets (log)  -0.0128*** -0.0128***  -0.0374*** -0.0374*** 0.0018*** 
 (-6.55) (-6.53)  (-6.48) (-6.45) (2.64) 
Family total net assets (log)  -0.0004 -0.0011  -0.0235** -0.0224** -0.0038** 
 (-0.14) (-0.38)  (-2.37) (-2.22) (-2.09) 
Fund age  0.0080*** 0.0074***  0.0149*** 0.0150*** -0.0028** 
 (7.70) (6.56)  (5.42) (4.67) (-2.31) 
Flows  0.0063*** 0.0062***  0.0178*** 0.0178*** -0.0002 
 (4.95) (4.84)  (3.92) (3.87) (-0.72) 
 
Observations 30,116 26,638 26,638 30,101 26,630 26,630 26,638 





Table 6 (continued) 
Panel B: By country of sale   
 Active share Total shareholder cost 
Fund industry 
Herfindahl 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Post pension act 0.0197*** 0.0154***  -0.0471** -0.0311**   
(4.09) (4.13)  (-2.50) (-2.09)   
Pre pension act (-3<= year <=-1)   0.0159   -0.0201 -0.0158 
   (1.08)   (-1.25) (-1.42) 
Pension act (year 0)   0.0392***   -0.1131*** -0.0167 
  (5.56)   (-5.90) (-1.26) 
Post pension act (year 1)   0.0411***   -0.1209*** -0.0201 
  (5.66)   (-6.26) (-1.51) 
Post pension act (year >=2)   0.0449***   -0.0951*** -0.0162 
   (5.83)   (-4.26) (-1.19) 
Total net assets (log)  -0.0137*** -0.0136***  -0.0316*** -0.0316*** -0.0003 
 (-8.54) (-8.48)  (-6.60) (-6.53) (-0.29) 
Family total net assets (log)  0.0002 -0.0011  -0.0311*** -0.0275*** 0.0005 
 (0.08) (-0.53)  (-5.04) (-4.30) (0.15) 
Fund age  0.0075*** 0.0069***  0.0196*** 0.0189*** -0.0025 
 (10.91) (8.67)  (7.86) (6.61) (-1.23) 
Flows  0.0071*** 0.0069***  0.0198*** 0.0195*** -0.0004 
 (9.38) (9.10)  (7.32) (6.97) (-0.56) 
      
Observations 62,155 56,320 56,320 62,132 56,306 56,306 56,320 






Determinants of the Performance of Active Funds 
This table presents estimates of panel regressions where the dependent variable is a fund’s yearly benchmark-adjusted return 
four-factor alpha. Benchmark-adjusted return is the difference between the fund net return and its benchmark return. Four-factor 
alphas are estimated using three years of past monthly benchmark-adjusted fund returns in U.S. dollars with regional factors 
(Asia, Europe, North America or Emerging Markets) or world factors in the case of world funds. The sample includes open-end 
active equity mutual funds taken from Lipper for which holdings are available in LionShares from 2002 to 2010. In Panel A the 
unit of observation is a fund’s primary share class i domiciled in country j in year t. In Panel B the unit of observation is a fund 
share class s offered for sale in country k in year t. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Regressions include year 
and benchmark dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics clustered by country of domicile-year 
(Panel A) or country of sale-year (Panel B) are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. 
Panel A: By country of domicile 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Active share 0.0319*** 0.0362*** 0.0171* 0.0230** 
(6.19) (5.29) (1.73) (1.98) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA)  0.0106   
  (0.43)   
Active share  Explicit indexing (% TNA)  -0.0351   
  (-0.95)   
Explicit indexing (average TSC)   -0.0166**  
   (-2.34)  
Active share  Explicit indexing (average TSC)   0.0163*  
   (1.75)  
Closet indexing (% TNA)    -0.0105 
    (-0.41) 
Active share  Closet indexing (% TNA)    0.0255 
    (0.75) 
Tracking error -0.0792*** -0.0793*** -0.0807*** -0.0781*** 
(-3.28) (-3.31) (-3.27) (-3.22) 
Total shareholder cost -0.0037*** -0.0037*** -0.0033*** -0.0037*** 
(-4.60) (-4.63) (-4.09) (-4.70) 
Total net assets (log) -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011** -0.0011*** 
(-2.62) (-2.74) (-2.55) (-2.61) 
Family total net assets (log) 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 
(5.53) (5.38) (5.26) (5.55) 
Fund age -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
(-0.26) (-0.29) (-0.31) (-0.30) 
Flows 0.0022*** 0.0021** 0.0020** 0.0022*** 
(2.63) (2.56) (2.39) (2.61) 
International fund dummy -0.0038 -0.0045 -0.0027 -0.0047 
(-0.80) (-0.95) (-0.56) (-1.02) 
Fund of fund dummy -0.0116*** -0.0118*** -0.0120*** -0.0118*** 
(-2.69) (-2.72) (-2.64) (-2.74) 
Off-shore fund dummy 0.0019 -0.0022 0.0080 0.0016 
(0.35) (-0.30) (1.07) (0.29) 
Approval -0.0047 -0.0042 -0.0035 -0.0045 
(-1.43) (-1.28) (-0.95) (-1.36) 
Judicial 0.0006** 0.0005 0.0007** 0.0006** 
(2.33) (1.53) (2.47) (2.32) 
Fund industry size (log) 0.0003 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0005 
(0.26) (0.62) (-0.28) (0.41) 
Fund industry Herfindahl -0.0105 -0.0012 -0.0091 -0.0108 
(-0.44) (-0.05) (-0.36) (-0.44) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.0001 0.0012 -0.0006 0.0007 
(0.03) (0.29) (-0.16) (0.17) 
 
Observations 51,570 51,570 50,007 51,570 
R-squared 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.074 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Panel B: By country of sale 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Active share 0.0549*** 0.0722*** 0.0350*** -0.0133 
(12.91) (11.21) (3.65) (-1.03) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA)  0.1196***   
  (4.16)   
Active share  Explicit indexing (% TNA)  -0.1753***   
  (-4.21)   
Explicit indexing (average TSC)   -0.0158**  
   (-2.17)  
Active share  Explicit indexing (average TSC)   0.0233**  
   (2.18)  
Closet indexing (% TNA)    -0.1391*** 
    (-3.81) 
Active share  Closet indexing (% TNA)    0.2311*** 
    (4.67) 
Tracking error -0.1176*** -0.1178*** -0.1191*** -0.1196*** 
(-5.14) (-5.19) (-5.17) (-5.32) 
Total shareholder cost -0.0051*** -0.0052*** -0.0051*** -0.0052*** 
(-15.39) (-15.48) (-15.24) (-15.34) 
Total net assets (log) -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** -0.0005*** 
(-6.40) (-6.42) (-6.32) (-6.36) 
Family total net assets (log) 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
(5.63) (5.29) (5.48) (5.97) 
Fund age 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
(4.92) (4.77) (4.87) (4.59) 
Flows 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.36) (0.30) (0.43) (0.49) 
International fund dummy 0.0019 0.0014 0.0018 -0.0002 
(0.60) (0.44) (0.58) (-0.06) 
Fund of fund dummy -0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0026 -0.0033 
(-1.03) (-1.20) (-1.14) (-1.45) 
Off-shore fund dummy -0.0042*** -0.0043*** -0.0043*** -0.0042*** 
(-5.16) (-5.27) (-5.31) (-5.27) 
Approval -0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0007 
(-1.65) (-1.47) (-1.44) (-1.20) 
Judicial 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001** 
(2.17) (2.15) (1.47) (2.49) 
Fund industry size (log) -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 
(-1.21) (-1.07) (-0.97) (-1.10) 
Fund industry Herfindahl -0.0079* -0.0080 -0.0055 -0.0092** 
(-1.71) (-1.55) (-0.89) (-2.03) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011 
(0.78) (0.81) (0.72) (0.90) 
    
Observations 346,711 346,711 340,940 346,711 





Fig. 1. Explicit and closet indexing by country of domicile. This figure shows the percentage that explicitly indexed funds 
represent of the TNA in a country (Explicit indexing), the percentage that active funds with active share measure below 0.6 
represent of the TNA in a country (Closet indexing), and the percentage that active funds with active share measure above 0.6 
represent of the TNA in a country (Truly active), as of December 2010. The sample includes open-end equity mutual funds from 




Fig. 2. Explicit and closet indexing by year. This figure shows the yearly percentage that explicitly indexed funds represent of the 
total TNA (Explicit indexing), the percentage that active funds with active share measure below 0.6 represent of the total TNA 
(Closet indexing), and the percentage that active funds with active share measure above 0.6 represent of the total TNA (Truly 
active). The sample includes open-end equity mutual funds from Lipper for which holdings are available in LionShares from 






Fig 3. Average total shareholder cost by country of domicile. This figure shows the TNA-weighted average total shareholder cost 
of funds, defined as total expense ratio plus one-fifth of the front-end load, as of December 2010. The sample includes open-end 
equity mutual funds from Lipper for which holdings are available in LionShares. Explicit indexing includes index funds and 
exchange-traded funds. Closet indexing includes active funds with active share below 0.6. Truly active includes active funds with 






Panel A: Explicit indexing (% TNA) 
 
Panel B: Explicit indexing (average TSC) 
 
Fig. 4. Explicit indexing around passage of the Pension Act. This figure shows the percentage that explicitly indexed funds 
represent of the country’s fund industry TNA (Panel A) and the average total shareholder costs of explicitly indexed funds (Panel 
B) for the treated group (countries that passed a pension act in year t) and the control group around passage of a pension act 
(between year -1 and year 0) in the funds’ country of sale. Explicit indexing includes index funds and exchange-traded funds. The 





















































Panel A: Active share 
 
Panel B: Total shareholder cost 
 
Fig. 5. Active management around passage of the Pension Act. This figure shows point estimates and 95% confidence intervals 
for the effect on the average active share (Panel A) and average total shareholder cost (Panel D) of active funds in the treated 
group (countries that passed a pension act in year t) relative to the control group around the country’s passage of a pension act 
(between year -1 and year 0) in the funds’ country of sale. The sample includes open-end equity mutual funds from Lipper for 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Panel A: Fund-level variables 
Active share Percentage of a fund’s portfolio holdings that differ from its benchmark index holdings.  
Tracking error Standard deviation (annualized) estimated with three-year of past monthly benchmark adjusted return in U.S. dollars. 
Total shareholder cost Annual total expense ratio plus one-fifth of the front-end load assuming a five-year holding period.  
Total net assets Total net assets in millions of U.S. dollars. 
Family total net assets Total net assets in millions of U.S. dollars of equity funds in the same management company excluding the own fund’s TNA. 
Fund age Number of years since the fund launch date. 
Flows Percentage growth in TNA, net of internal growth (assuming reinvestment of dividends and distributions). 
International fund dummy Dummy that takes the value of one if a fund’s geographic focus is different from the fund’s country of domicile. 
Fund of fund dummy Dummy that takes the value of one if fund of fund. 
Off-shore fund dummy Dummy that takes the value of one if fund is located in an off-shore domicile. 
Benchmark-adjusted return Difference between the fund net return and its benchmark return (percentage per year). 
Benchmark-adjusted return four-factor 
alpha 
Four-factor alpha (percentage per year) estimated with three years of past monthly fund benchmark-adjusted returns in U.S. dollars and regional 
factors (Asia, Europe, North America or Emerging Markets) or world factors in the case of world funds. 
Panel B: Country-level variables 
Explicit indexing (% TNA) Percentage that explicitly indexed funds represent of the TNA of open-end equity mutual funds in the fund’s country. 
Explicit indexing (average TSC) TNA-weighted average total shareholder cost of explicitly indexed funds in the fund's country. 
Closet indexing (% TNA) Percentage that active funds with active share below 0.6 represent of the TNA of open-end equity mutual funds in the fund's country. 
Approval Sum of two dummy variables that take value of one if (1) the fund startup requires regulatory approval and (2) the prospectus requires 
regulatory approval (Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2005)). 
Judicial Judicial system quality defined as the sum of five variables (all variables are scaled between 0 and 10)): the efficiency of the judicial system, 
rule of law, corruption, risk of expropriation and risk of contract repudiation (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998)).  
Fund industry size Sum of total net assets (in millions of U.S. dollar) for open-end equity mutual funds in the fund’s country. 
Fund industry Herfindahl Sum of squared market shares of fund management companies for open-end equity mutual funds in the fund’s country. 
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1. Descriptive Statistics 
In Table IA.1, we provide summary statistics for the funds in our LionShares data over the 
2002-2010 sample period. We expand on the statistics of the country characteristics in Table 
IA.2 by showing the time series averages by country. Table IA.3 shows the number of fund share 
classes by country of sale and country of domicile.  
2. Explicit and Closet Indexing by Country and Benchmark Type 
A fund’s active share may depend on the opportunities and constraints in the investment 
opportunity set of the fund manager, which will naturally differ across benchmarks. Table IA.4 
groups the 88 benchmarks in our analysis into benchmark types: world, regional and country. 
Table IA.5 shows the total net assets (TNA) and the market shares of explicit and closet 
indexing per country as of December 2010 in the three different benchmark types: world, 
regional, and country funds. We further separate funds with a country benchmark into country - 
domestic (funds that invest in stocks of the same country where they are domiciled) and country 
- foreign (funds that invest in stocks of a country different from the one where they are 
domiciled). Panel A of Table IA.5 shows that the majority of equity mutual fund assets are 
invested domestically ($4.4 trillion). The next most prevalent type of fund is regional funds ($1.8 
trillion), followed by world funds ($1.2 trillion), and foreign country funds ($0.4 trillion). 
However, the proportions are not universal across countries. For example, domestic funds are 
predominant in the U.S, but world and regional funds are relatively more important in European 
countries. Panel A of Table IA.5 also shows the amount of explicit indexing per country of 
domicile according to fund benchmark type. The level of explicit indexing is highest for 
domestic country funds, where 27% of the fund assets are indexed. Explicit indexing is used less 




addition, closet indexing is less common for funds pursuing global investment strategies (11%) 
than for regional funds (24%), domestic country funds (21%), and foreign country funds (27%).  
Panel B of Table IA.5 presents similar statistics by country of sale. 
To take into account benchmark characteristics, we analyze the prevalence of indexing (as in 
Table 2) we separate the analysis by the country and benchmark type level (world, regional, 
country-domestic, and country-foreign). Table IA.6 presents the results by country of domicile 
(Panel A) and country of sale (Panel B). Consistent with Table 2, the evidence indicates that a 
strong regulatory environment and a large fund industry are positively correlated with the 
prevalence of explicit indexing and negatively correlated with closet indexing. 
3. Robustness 
We conduct several robustness checks on the results of Table 3 (active share) in Table IA.7, 
Table 5 (TSC) in Table IA.8, and Table 7 (performance) in Table IA.11. In each table, Panel A 
reports the results by country of domicile and Panel B by country of sale. 
The first robustness check we conduct is to estimate the results using only the non-U.S. fund 
sample in order to alleviate the concern that funds domiciled or sold in the United States 
represent a large fraction of the observations and may distort our conclusions.  
The second type of robustness check is to employ alternative methods of calculating funds’ 
active shares. First, we construct the index weights based only on ETFs that undertake full 
physical replication of the indices. For the majority of the 88 benchmarks (see Table IA.4), we 
can identify a SPDR or iShares ETF that tracks these benchmarks. We call the active share 
measured against the ETF weights the Pure-ETF active share. Second, to address any potential 
issues with Lipper’s assignment of the Technical Indicator Benchmark to each fund, we 




Petajisto (2009), we take the most representative benchmark for a fund in each year as the one 
with the lowest active share. We call this alternative measure the Minimum active share. We find 
that in our sample both of these alternative measures are highly correlated with the active share 
we employ in our main tests (correlation coefficients of 0.97 with the pure-ETF active share and 
0.94 with the minimum active share). For active funds, the average (TNA-weighted) pure-ETF 
active share is 70% and the minimum active share is 65% which are similar to the levels of our 
main measure of active share. Finally, we calculate an Active Share (vs. Active) - the fraction of a 
fund’s portfolio holdings that differ from the aggregate stock portfolio of active funds that track 
a fund’s benchmark, in the spirit of the overlap measure of Wahal and Wang (2011). 
The third robustness check considers alternative econometric specifications. We estimate the 
regression model using weighted least squares, where the total net assets of the fund are 
employed as the weights. We also estimate regressions using country of domicile fixed effects. 
The fourth robustness check looks at specific types of funds. First, we use the sample of 
domestic funds, which is more commonly used in single-country studies as in the majority of the 
literature on U.S. equity mutual funds. We also present the analysis by measuring explicit and 
closet indexing separately by benchmark type (world, regional, country-domestic, and country-
foreign) in each country. The diversity in the universe of stocks tracked by each benchmark has 
implications for the measurement of active share. For example, the SSgA World Index Equity 
Fund that tracks the MSCI World index (the most popular world index) holds over 1,600 stocks 
in its portfolio at the end of 2010, while the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust tracking the S&P 500 
index (the most popular country index) holds 500 stocks. Many explicitly indexed funds do not 
engage in full physical replication. The average index or ETF fund tracking the S&P 500 has an 




may matter for the measurement of active share.  
Finally, we perform several other robustness checks of the fund performance regressions. 
These are reported in Table IA.11. We show that results are robust when we use benchmark-
adjusted returns and several alternative risk-adjusted performance measures in alternative to the 
benchmark-adjusted return four-factor alpha. We use excess return (over U.S. T-bills) four-factor 
alphas and the information ratio (ratio of four-factor benchmark-adjusted return alpha by the 
standard deviation of residuals). Further we include the Amihud and Goyenko (2013) R-squared 
measure as an explanatory variable. Specifically, we use a logistic transformation of R-squared, 
TR2 = log[sqrt(R-squared)/(1 – sqrt(R-squared))] where R-squared is estimated using the 
benchmark-adjusted return four-factor model. A lower R-squared is indicative of more active 
management. We find that TR2 is insignificantly related to future fund performance in a 
regression that also includes active share and tracking error. Only active share is a statistically 
significant predictor of future fund performance. The coefficients on tracking error and TR2 are 
also insignificant in regressions that do not include active share. 
We extend the differences-in-differences analysis of Pension Acts to examine the effect on 
fund performance. We estimate the equivalent to the performance regression in column (2) of 
Table 7, but replacing the market share of explicitly indexed funds with the Post pension act 
(year >=0) dummy variable. The results in Table IA.12 of the Internet Appendix are consistent 
with those in Table 7. We find that the coefficient on the Post pension act (year >=0) variable is 
positive and significant, which indicates that performance improves more for the treatment group 
than the control group following the passage of the Pension Act. Moreover, the coefficient on 
active share is positive and significant and the interaction between active share and Post pension 




4. Instrumental Variable Regressions 
As an alternative strategy to address endogeneity concerns, we employ instrumental variables 
methods. We use two instruments for explicit indexing – i.e., variables that are correlated with 
the availability of explicitly indexed funds in a given market but should be uncorrelated with the 
active share and fees charged by active funds (other than through their correlation with explicitly 
index funds). The first instrument is the financial sophistication of retail investors in a country, 
which should be associated with the demand for low-cost alternatives to achieve beta exposure. 
That is, financially literate investors are more likely to be aware that passive funds can deliver 
the same fundamental beta exposure as active funds but at a lower cost. Thus, those investors 
will have higher demand for the indexed funds. We proxy for financial literacy in a country 
using the variable Financial sophistication measured by the World Economic Forum in the 
annual Global Competitiveness Report using the question “The level of sophistication of 
financial markets is higher than international norms.” 
The second instrument is based on the development of the defined contribution (DC) pension 
market in a country, which can increase the demand for passive funds providing beta exposure 
(for example, by offering at least one passive fund in their menu of investment options). The 
instrument, DC pension market, takes the value of one if a country’s DC market is “Developed”, 
the value of one-half if the market is “Nascent”, and zero if there is no market, according to the 
KPMG (2011) classification. 
Table IA.9 reports estimates of two-stage least squares (2SLS) active share regressions using 
instrumental variables methods. Table IA.10 reports similar 2SLS regressions of the total 
shareholder cost (TSC) of active funds. These results lead to the conclusion that indexing plays 




evidence suggests a link from more passive management in a market to more competitive 
strategies by active funds such as lower fees and more product differentiation. However, these 
results should be interpreted with caution since they rely on the validity of the instruments. 
We consider one more analysis designed to capture the effects of the increased presence of 
explicitly indexed funds on the behavior and pricing of the active funds in a country. 
Specifically, we evaluate whether the hypothesized direct competitive shocks occur given the 
entry of low-cost explicitly indexed funds in different markets. We focus on the first time an 
index fund or ETF is available in a given country and benchmark index, with the advantage that 
such effects are staggered over time. In unreported results, we find that entry of indexed funds is 
associated with an increase in active shares and reduced fees of active funds in the country. 
However, the coefficients from the analysis are imprecisely estimated, as over four-fifths of 
country-benchmarks already have indexed funds at the start of our sample period. There is also 
the possibility that these events are not truly exogenous because the entry decision of passive 







This table presents mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and number of observations of variables. The 
sample includes open-end active equity mutual funds taken from Lipper for which holdings are available in LionShares from 
2002 to 2010. 
Variable Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
Active share 0.7050 0.7437 0.2190 0.0000 1.0000 67,195 
Pure-ETF active share 0.7047 0.7430 0.2240 0.0000 1.0000 52,984 
Minimum active share 0.6687 0.7009 0.2069 0.0000 1.0000 66,893 
TR2 0.1096 0.1008 0.7621 -3.8332 4.6313 62,078 
Tracking error 0.0705 0.0594 0.0467 0.0027 1.7320 62,096 
Total shareholder cost 2.12 2.19 0.83 0.13 4.46 67,146 
Total net assets ($ million) 634 115 3,128 0 193,453 67,195 
Family total net assets ($ million) 20,824 4,228 72,265 0 832,483 67,184 
Fund age 10.70 8.50 9.44 0.00 86.42 67,195 
Flows 0.1402 -0.0357 0.7287 -0.8563 4.7889 60,461 
International fund dummy 0.5899 1.0000 0.4919 0.0000 1.0000 67,177 
Fund of fund dummy 0.0135 0.0000 0.1156 0.0000 1.0000 67,195 
Off-shore fund dummy 0.1782 0.0000 0.3827 0.0000 1.0000 67,195 
Benchmark-adjusted return 0.0004 -0.0061 0.0838 -0.2818 0.3309 66,104 
Benchmark-adjusted four-factor alphas -0.0014 -0.0049 0.0793 -0.2602 0.2819 56,991 
Excess return four-factor alphas -0.0019 -0.0164 0.1223 -0.3170 0.4967 57,460 
Information ratio -0.0545 -0.1025 1.2898 -3.4331 3.2447 56,991 
Explicit indexing (% TNA) 0.1280 0.0870 0.1109 0.0000 0.9574 67,195 
Explicit indexing (average TSC) 0.7696 0.6499 0.5271 0.1546 2.9700 64,558 
Closet indexing (% TNA) 0.3312 0.3233 0.1484 0.0000 1.0000 67,195 
Approval 1.49 1.00 0.50 1.00 2.00 67,195 
Judicial 42.96 47.01 7.01 29.67 49.96 67,195 
Fund industry size ($ million) 1,523,089 436,414 2,037,732 652 6,219,298 67,195 
Fund industry Herfindahl 0.0697 0.0476 0.0564 0.0230 0.3482 67,195 
GDP per capita ($) 49,033 44,117 25,301 563 118,841 66,663 
Financial sophistication 6.10 6.30 0.59 3.20 6.80 66,005 









Time series averages of country variables 
This table presents time-series average of country variables in the 2002-2010 period.  















Australia 2 47 207,996 0.0468 40,831 6.21 1.0 1992 
Austria 2 47 18,380 0.1288 40,953 5.32 0.0 1990 
Belgium 2 47 34,468 0.3066 38,895 5.71 0.0 2003 
Brazil 2 32 90,809 0.1114 9,744 5.40 1.0   
Canada 1 48 333,830 0.0468 39,104 6.20 0.5 1997 
China 1 31 167,406 0.0396 3,838 3.20 0.5   
Denmark 1 49 25,568 0.1055 51,775 5.85 1.0 2006 
Finland 1 49 22,705 0.1590 42,183 5.93 0.5 2007 
France 2 45 266,107 0.0502 37,363 5.81 0.5 2003 
Germany 1 47 136,732 0.1563 36,697 5.97 0.5 2004 
Hong Kong 2 44 29,087 0.1902 29,518 6.43 1.0   
India 2 31 31,028 0.0929 1,095 5.01 0.5   
Ireland 1 35 205,832 0.0472 50,147 5.94 1.0   
Israel 2 40 3,719 0.0830 27,313 5.90 1.0   
Italy 2 40 67,003 0.0966 31,789 4.38 0.5 2000 
Japan 2 47 152,159 0.0988 37,550 5.21  2001 
Liechtenstein 1 31 6,520 0.1780                  
Luxembourg 1 31 679,193 0.0310 95,617 6.20 0.0   
Malaysia 2 39 10,381 0.2407 7,037 5.25 1.0   
Netherlands 2 49 41,967 0.1336 43,256 6.08 0.5 2006 
Norway 1 50 25,407 0.1716 71,472 5.48 1.0 2006 
Poland 1 31 7,933 0.1082 10,585 4.01 0.5 2004 
Portugal 1 39 2,798 0.1846 19,557 5.22 0.0 2007 
Singapore 1 45 15,137 0.0656 34,350 6.01 1.0   
South Africa 1 32 21,763 0.0963 6,076 5.92 1.0   
Spain 2 39 26,100 0.0957 28,049 5.40 0.5 2002 
Sweden 2 49 88,017 0.1637 43,446 6.08 0.0 2000 
Switzerland 1 50 74,268 0.2100 56,964 6.60 1.0 2003 
Taiwan 1 40 23,140 0.0633 17,472 4.79    
Thailand 2 30 4,667 0.1177 3,845 4.71 0.5   
United Kingdom 1 47 562,228 0.0257 37,855 6.73 0.0 2004 
United States 2 48 4,617,651 0.0470 43,806 6.44 1.0 1974   
       






Number of fund share classes by country of domicile and country of sale 
This table presents the number of fund share classes offered by country of domicile and country of sale for the sample of open-end equity mutual funds taken from Lipper for 
which holdings are available in LionShares as of December 2010. Rows correspond to the fund legal country of domicile. Columns correspond to countries where fund share 
classes are approved for sale. A fund share class is counted multiple times based on how many countries it is approved for sale according to Lipper.  
Country of sale 
Country of 






Count.  Total 
Austria 324 20 195 39 3 31 27 24 9 263 935 
Belgium 76 273 6 110 105 4 131 104 26 7 39 1 142 1,024 
Canada 2,083   1 1 2,085 
Denmark 203 1 9 20  17 19 16 24 19 17 2 347 
Finland 155 2 2  2 2 20 54  14 251 
France 36 54 772 130 39 117 87 75 114 42 137 65 14 9 1,691 
Germany 173 6 34 411 11 31 20 2 9 59 1 16 42 815 
Ireland 463 236 151 300 538 697 923 296 433 503 256 105 82 434 511 615 818 769 41 691 8,862 
Italy 4 136  140 
Liechtenstein 26 37  57 3 3 112 238 
Luxembourg 4,627 2,660 31 2,334 3,451 4,628 5,571 1,754 3,719 60 6,663 4,269 2,852 1,572 3,223 4,422 4,307 5,333 4,629 6,095 320 18,832 91,352 
Netherlands 1 3 2 2 1 75 1 2 2 1 3 93 
Norway 3 13  3 12 117 29 3 13 2 195 
Poland  46  46 
Portugal  53  5 58 
Spain 2 2 269  273 
Sweden 4 16 5 1  12 5 38 266  2 26 375 
Switzerland 6 4 7  15 369 7 30 438 
United Kingdom 124 63 50 31 139 175 129 34 91 100 25 1 28 57 47 152 1,366 85 13 224 2,934 
United States 1 6 2 7  7 24  8,976 32 615 9,670 
Asia Pacific 1   1,650 224 1,875 
Other Regions   168 57 225 




List of benchmark indices 
This table lists the 88 benchmarks (Technical Indicator Benchmarks) for the sample of open-end active equity mutual funds 
taken from Lipper with portfolio holdings in LionShares as of December 2010. The sum of total net assets (in billions of U.S. 
dollars) of the equity mutual funds tracking each benchmark is presented in brackets. 
World Regional Country 
MSCI World [$456] MSCI EM (Emerging Markets) [$549] Australia ASX All Ordinaries [$20] 
MSCI World ex USA [$320] MSCI EU Growth [$195] Austria ATX Prime [$2] 
MSCI AC World [$96] STOXX Europe 50 [$192] Belgium Brussels SE [$2] 
FTSE AW/Oil & Gas [$62] MSCI AC Asia Pacific ex Japan [$177] Canada S&P/TSX Composite [$180] 
MSCI World Growth [$53] MSCI Europe Australia & Far East ex-Japan [$158] MSCI Canada Small Cap [$16] 
MSCI World ex USA Small Cap [$46] MSCI EAFE [$119] FTSE Canada/Oil & Gas [$11] 
FTSE Gold Mines [$39] EURO STOXX 50 [$92] Denmark OMX Copenhagen All Share [$3] 
FTSE AW/Mining [$26] MSCI EM Latin America [$76] Finland OMX Helsinki [$6] 
Dow Jones Wilshire Global Ex-US [$19] S&P North American Natural Resources [$59] France CAC 40 [$25] 
FTSE AW (Dev)/Real Estate Inv. [$16] MSCI Europe ex UK [$57] Germany DAX 30 [$48] 
FTSE AW/Utilities [$15] MSCI AC Asia Pacific [$44] Italy MSCI Italy [$7] 
FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Developed [$15] MSCI EM Eastern Europe [$33] Netherlands AEX [$8] 
MSCI World Small Cap [$14] MSCI Europe Small Cap  [$28] Norway MSCI Norway [$15] 
MSCI World Value [$12] MSCI Golden Dragon [$25] Poland Poland WIG [$6] 
MSCI World ex Australia [$8] MSCI BRIC [$24] Portugal Portugal PSI General [$1] 
LCI UK & World Equity (50:50) [$5] MSCI Nordic Countries [$17] Spain Madrid SE [$4] 
Dow Jones Commodity [$1] EURO STOXX [$5] Sweden OMX Stockholm All Share [$54] 
Switzerland Swiss Performance Index [$40] 
United FTSE 100 [$157] 
Kingdom FTSE All-Share [$79] 
Hoare Govett Small Cap Extended [$20] 
United S&P 500 [$979] 
States Russell 1000 Growth [$636] 
Russell 3000 [$400] 
Russell MidCap [$275] 
Russell MidCap Growth [$252] 
Russell 1000 [$206] 
Russell 2000 [$184] 
Russell 1000 Value [$139] 
Russell 2000 Growth [$100] 
S&P 500 Growth [$92] 
S&P MidCap 400 [$92] 
S&P 500 Value [$73] 
S&P 100 [$72] 
S&P U.S. Real Estate Investment Trust [$63] 
S&P 400 Value [$61] 
Russell MidCap Value [$51] 
Dow Jones US Healthcare [$43] 
Russell 2000 Value [$42] 
S&P 600 Small Cap [$27] 
NASDAQ Composite [$13] 
Asia Pacific Topix [$82] 
CSI 300 [$75] 
BSE 100 [$72] 
MSCI China [$47] 
Hang Seng [$14] 
Taiwan Weighted Price [$12] 
Thailand SET [$6] 
FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI [$3] 
Singapore Straits Time [$3] 
Other  Russia Moscow Times [$19] 
Regions FTSE South Africa [$18] 
BOVESPA (Ibovespa) [$17] 





Explicit and closet indexing by country and benchmark type 
This table presents total net assets (TNA) and market shares of explicit and closet indexing per country and benchmark type. The sample consists of open-end equity mutual 
funds taken from Lipper with portfolio holdings in LionShares as of December 2010. Explicit indexing is the percentage that explicitly indexed funds represent of the TNA in a 
country. Closet indexing is the percentage of the TNA by active funds with active share measure below 0.6. Funds are classified based on their benchmark as world funds, regional 
funds, country - domestic funds (funds investing in their country of domicile) and country - foreign funds (funds investing in a country different from their domicile). Panel A 
presents statistics based on the primary fund country of domicile and Panel B presents statistics based on the fund share class country of sale.  
Panel A: By country of domicile 
Domicile 

































Austria 3.4 2 7 8.3 1 35 1.4 0 100 1.8 20 39
Belgium 3.2 5 9 9.1 22 49 1.7 6 91 4.0 37 37
Canada 77.1 4 3 15.4 4 13 204.9 10 56 29.1 3 9
Denmark 10.3 0 5 12.7 1 21 3.1 0 98 4.4 9 44
Finland 2.7 0 0 11.5 2 24 5.7 8 81 6.2 1 69
France 24.1 15 4 68.5 30 28 24.9 10 68 16.6 42 12
Germany 50.4 0 1 42.4 27 28 42.3 21 78 4.4 38 38
Ireland 42.8 25 15 97.7 28 37 0.0 82.0 37 17
Italy 6.5 0 0 17.5 0 37 4.2 0 100 3.1 0 24
Liechtenstein 3.1 0 2 1.7 0 18 0.0 1.2 0 58
Luxembourg 170.0 3 13 389.8 5 26 0.0 190.8 4 36
Netherlands 22.1 0 4 4.4 0 50 6.7 5 56 0.4 0 70
Norway 11.3 13 6 13.9 4 11 14.5 3 53 1.7 19 47
Poland 1.7 0 0 0.7 0 7 5.9 0 81 0.0
Portugal 0.5 0 0 0.8 0 31 0.5 1 99 0.3 0 11
Spain 2.4 0 0 6.4 6 41 3.3 20 69 0.9 16 68
Sweden 25.6 1 13 25.8 7 55 52.2 17 73 10.0 10 76
Switzerland 11.7 33 13 11.6 48 11 34.4 63 35 11.9 79 14
United Kingdom 90.2 0 11 127.3 4 17 239.1 14 53 47.6 15 11
United States 613.5 18 12 960.7 25 21 3,576.2 29 14 0.0
Asia Pacific 28.1 0 6 21.2 0 5 185.5 27 23 20.6 58 17
Other Regions 3.8 0 1 0.2 0 17 25.3 1 47 0.1 0 12
    
Total (Non-U.S.) 590.7 5 9 887.1 11 26 855.8 17 50 437.3 18 27




Table IA.5 (continued) 
Panel B: By country of sale 
Domicile 

































Austria 255.6 4 9 476.8 12 24 71.3 16 64 216.0 17 28 
Belgium 115.1 1 15 269.1 5 26 17.1 1 83 117.7 6 31 
Canada 75.7 4 3 17.1 4 16 204.0 10 56 29.7 3 9 
Denmark 105.2 7 14 251.4 12 25 13.0 0 77 106.9 17 33 
Finland 109.5 3 17 315.1 7 27 10.6 5 59 146.5 6 34 
France 214.8 8 12 506.7 14 24 72.7 15 52 230.2 17 27 
Germany 298.1 6 9 556.8 14 24 78.2 13 65 252.5 17 29 
Ireland 128.1 10 15 293.0 13 25 21.7 152.4 22 24 
Italy 167.7 4 14 363.4 7 27 26.2 26 56 148.7 8 36 
Liechtenstein 0.0 0 0 0.6 1 56 0.0 0.8 5 10 
Luxembourg 252.5 7 9 496.1 12 26 50.0 249.2 16 30 
Netherlands 216.0 7 13 441.4 15 22 36.7 43 38 205.8 17 28 
Norway 98.7 2 16 240.8 1 30 22.6 12 54 120.2 1 40 
Poland 63.6 0 17 111.1 0 36 5.9 0 81 52.3  
Portugal 89.1 0 20 228.7 2 27 3.1 0 96 119.3 3 41 
Spain 180.0 6 12 403.0 11 26 25.3 3 81 197.6 15 28 
Sweden 189.0 9 14 410.6 11 24 61.4 15 67 195.1 14 31 
Switzerland 255.6 8 9 524.8 15 21 79.1 29 44 246.1 20 26 
United Kingdom 255.9 6 13 539.2 12 21 242.8 14 52 269.4 17 22 
United States 605.6 18 12 936.3 26 20 3,536.8 29 14 0.0  
Asia Pacific 355.1 4 13 817.1 12 22 559.5 68 11 371.5 8 25 
Other Regions 30.8 0 12 71.5 0 13 32.8 0 42 28.2 0 48 
Other Countries 1,032.6 15 14 2,412.1 13 24 1,449.8 67 18 766.0 4 34 
    
Total (Non-U.S.) 4,488.6 8 13 9,746.5 11 24 3,083.7 49 30 4,221.9 12 30 







Determinants of explicit and closet indexing: robustness by country and benchmark type 
This table presents estimates of yearly country-level regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage that 
explicitly indexed funds represent of the TNA in a country (Explicit Indexing (% TNA)), the TNA-weighted average total 
shareholder cost of explicitly indexed funds in a country (Explicit Indexing (Average TSC)), and the percentage that active funds 
with active share measure below 0.6 represent of the TNA in a country (Closet Indexing (% TNA)). The sample includes open-
end equity mutual funds taken from Lipper for which holdings are available in LionShares from 2002 to 2010. In Panel A the unit 
of observation is a country of domicile j and benchmark type b in year t. In Panel B the unit of observation is a country of sale k 
and benchmark type b in year t. Benchmark types are world funds, regional funds, country - domestic funds (funds investing in 
their country of domicile) and country - foreign funds (funds investing in a country different from their domicile). Regressions 
include year dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Panel A: By Country of domicile and benchmark type 
 
Explicit indexing  
(% TNA) 
Explicit indexing  
(Average TSC) 
Closet indexing  
(% TNA) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Approval 0.0183 0.1308** 0.0024 
(1.49) (2.58) (0.10) 
Judicial 0.0021** -0.0218*** -0.0030* 
(2.25) (-5.57) (-1.75) 
Fund industry size (log) 0.0206*** -0.0766*** -0.0166* 
(4.32) (-3.84) (-1.91) 
Fund industry Herfindahl 0.3905*** 0.4524 0.2326 
(3.81) (1.08) (1.23) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.0003 -0.0366 -0.0070 
(0.04) (-1.18) (-0.48) 
       
Observations 491 473 409 409 490 472 
R-squared 0.023 0.064 0.104 0.123 0.080 0.102 
Panel B: By country of sale and benchmark type 
 
Explicit indexing  
(% TNA) 
Explicit indexing  
(Average TSC) 
Closet indexing  
(% TNA) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Approval 0.0943***  -0.1936***  -0.0596***  
 (6.83)  (-5.04)  (-2.68)  
Judicial 0.0053***  -0.0352***  -0.0092***  
 (5.20)  (-11.82)  (-5.60)  
Fund industry size (log)  0.0183***  -0.1004***  -0.0281*** 
  (3.66)  (-7.58)  (-3.45) 
Fund industry Herfindahl  -0.1856  1.5400***  0.0230 
  (-1.46)  (4.81)  (0.11) 
GDP per capita (log)  0.0043  -0.0965***  -0.0116 
  (0.55)  (-4.82)  (-0.90) 
       
Observations 491 491 471 471 490 490 








Determinants of active management: robustness 
This table presents estimates of panel regressions where the dependent variable is a fund’s active share at year-end, defined as the percentage of a fund’s portfolio holdings 
that differ from the fund’s benchmark. Columns (1) and (2) use the sample of non-U.S. domiciled mutual funds. In columns (3) and (4) the dependent variable is the active share 
measure calculated as the percentage of portfolio holdings that differ from pure-ETFs that track each benchmark. In columns (5) and (6) the dependent variable is the minimum 
active share calculated against all possible 88 benchmarks. In columns (7) and (8) the dependent variable is the active share calculated against the aggregate stock portfolio of 
active funds. Columns (9) and (10) present regressions estimates using weighted least squares where the weights are the fund’s total net assets. Columns (11) and (12) present 
regressions estimates including country fixed effects. Columns (13) and (14) present estimates for the sample of domestic funds. Columns (15) and (16) measure explicit indexing 
at the country-benchmark type level. The sample includes open-end active equity mutual funds taken from Lipper for which holdings are available in LionShares from 2002 to 
2010. In Panel A the unit of observation is a fund’s primary share class i domiciled in country j in year t. In Panel B the unit of observation is a fund share class s offered for sale in 
country k in year t. Regressions include the fund and country control variables used in Table 3 (coefficients not shown) as well as year and benchmark dummies. Refer to 
Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics clustered by country of domicile-year (Panel A) or country of sale-year (Panel B) are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** 
reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Panel A: By country of domicile 
 Non-U.S. funds  Pure-ETF active share  Minimum active share  Active share (vs. active) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA) 0.0115  0.0414**  0.0353**  0.0235  
(0.74)  (2.43)  (2.16)  (1.30)  
Explicit indexing (Avg. TSC) -0.0210***  -0.0255***  -0.0275***   -0.0297*** 
(-4.31)  (-4.48)  (-4.79)   (-5.50) 
            
Observations 41,155 39,222  46,712 45,667  58,255 56,324  58,487 56,554 
R-squared 0.620 0.621  0.598 0.601  0.566 0.566  0.620 0.619 
 Weighted-least squares   Country fixed effects   Domestic funds  By country-benchmark type 
  (9) (10)  (11) (12)  (13) (14)  (15) (16) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA) -0.0256   -0.0113   0.0641*   0.0175  
 (-0.98)   (-0.30)   (1.74)   (0.97)  
Explicit indexing (Avg. TSC)  -0.0325***   -0.0383***   -0.0469**   -0.0284*** 
  (-3.37)   (-3.66)   (-2.64)   (-4.42) 
            
Observations 58,487 56,554  58,931 56,554  24,825 24,156  58,487 56,554 







Table IA.7 (continued) 
Panel B: By country of sale 
 Non-U.S. funds  Pure-ETF active share  Minimum active share  Active share (vs. active) 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA) 0.0085  0.0300***  0.0192***  0.0164**  
(1.22)  (4.02)  (2.78)  (2.14)  
Explicit indexing (Avg. TSC) -0.0087***  -0.0100***  -0.0140***   -0.0132*** 
(-3.81)  (-4.16)  (-5.14)   (-4.61) 
            
Observations 372,239 364,933  362,794 356,635  420,378 413,073  443,706 435,899 
R-squared 0.623 0.623  0.594 0.593  0.568 0.567  0.618 0.618 
 Weighted-least squares   Country fixed effects   Domestic funds  By country-benchmark type 
  (9) (10)  (11) (12)  (13) (14)  (13) (14) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA) 0.0332*   -0.0028   0.0229   -0.0109  
 (1.96)   (-0.21)   (0.56)   (-0.98)  
Explicit indexing (Avg. TSC)  -0.0087   -0.0162***   -0.0302***   -0.0117*** 
  (-1.64)   (-4.57)   (-2.90)   (-3.28) 
            
Observations 423,103 415,797  423,103 415,797  56,202 55,963  423,103 415,797 









Determinants of the total shareholder costs of active funds: robustness 
This table presents estimates of panel regressions where the dependent variable is a fund’s yearly total shareholder cost, defined as total expense ratio plus one-fifth of the 
front-end load. Columns (1)-(3) use the sample of non-U.S. domiciled mutual funds. In columns (4)-(6) the active share measure is calculated as the percentage of portfolio 
holdings that differ from pure-ETFs that track each benchmark. In columns (7)-(9) the minimum active share is calculated against all possible 88 benchmarks. In columns (10)-(12) 
the active share is calculated against the aggregate stock portfolio of active funds. Columns (13)-(15) present regressions estimates using weighted least squares where the weights 
are the fund’s total net assets. Columns (16)-(18) present regressions estimates including country fixed effects. Columns (19)-(21) presents estimates for the sample of domestic 
funds. Columns (22)-(24) measure explicit at the country-benchmark type level. The sample includes open-end active equity mutual funds taken from Lipper for which holdings 
are available in LionShares from 2002 to 2010. In Panel A the unit of observation is a fund’s primary share class i domiciled in country j in year t. In Panel B the unit of 
observation is a fund share class s offered for sale in country k in year t. Regressions include the fund and country control variables used in Table 4 (coefficients not shown) as well 
as year and benchmark dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics clustered by country of domicile-year (Panel A) or country of sale-year (Panel B) 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Panel A: By country of domicile 
 Non-U.S. funds  Pure-ETF active share  Minimum active share  Active share (vs. active) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA) -0.0924    0.0263    -0.0647    -0.0540   
(-0.75)    (0.24)    (-0.52)    (-0.43)   
Explicit indexing (Avg. TSC)  0.3276***    0.3138***    0.3257***    0.3288***  
 (6.73)    (6.23)    (7.43)    (7.52)  
Closet indexing (% TNA)   0.0024    0.1148    0.2866**    0.2790** 
   (0.02)    (1.01)    (2.46)    (2.37) 
Active share 0.5970*** 0.6189*** 0.5968***  0.6156*** 0.6327*** 0.6191***  0.5895*** 0.6127*** 0.6015***  0.5980*** 0.662*** 0.610*** 
 (11.93) (11.85) (11.87)  (11.95) (11.86) (11.99)  (13.83) (14.21) (13.90)  (13.43) (14.54) (13.40) 
                
Observations 41,155 39,222 41,155  46,712 45,667 46,712  58,255 56,324 58,255  58,487 56,554 58,487 
R-squared 0.287 0.289 0.287  0.372 0.381 0.372  0.389 0.391 0.390  0.388 0.3923 0.3897 
 Weighted-least squares  Country fixed effects   Domestic funds   By country-benchmark type 
 (13) (14) (15)  (16) (17) (18)  (19) (20) (21)  (22) (23) (24) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA) -0.1276    -0.3483**    -0.1437    0.0102   
 (-0.67)    (-2.21)    (-0.98)    (0.10)   
Explicit indexing (Avg. TSC)  0.2755***    0.0920***    -0.0334    0.4451***  
  (5.07)    (2.70)    (-0.72)    (12.94)  
Closet indexing (% TNA)   0.3311**    0.2159***    0.1273*    0.0222 
   (2.25)    (2.71)    (1.83)    (0.39) 
Active share 0.5032*** 0.5103*** 0.5126***  0.2561*** 0.2560*** 0.2590***  0.6249*** 0.6398*** 0.6264***  0.6078*** 0.6378*** 0.6095*** 
 (6.42) (6.29) (6.43)  (8.45) (8.10) (8.52)  (14.55) (14.59) (14.59)  (13.94) (14.21) (14.17) 
                
Observations 58,487 56,554 58,487  58,931 56,554 58,931  24,825 24,156 24,825  58,487 56,554 58,487 






Table IA.8 (continued) 
Panel B: By country of sale 
 Non-U.S. funds  Pure-ETF active share  Minimum active Share  Active share (vs. active) 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA) -0.3071***    -0.4480***    -0.4170***    -0.4079***   
(-3.55)    (-5.23)    (-4.27)    (-3.71)   
Explicit indexing (Avg. TSC)  0.1003***    0.0874***    0.1261***    0.1224***  
 (5.00)    (4.80)    (6.00)    (5.32)  
Closet indexing (% TNA)   -0.1382    0.5082***    0.3024**    0.4601*** 
   (-1.05)    (3.86)    (2.31)    (2.71) 
Active share 0.5830*** 0.5808*** 0.5818***  0.5739*** 0.5728*** 0.5749***  0.6005*** 0.6026*** 0.6021***  0.6169*** 0.6171*** 0.6204*** 
 (24.36) (24.00) (24.18)  (22.03) (21.73) (21.89)  (24.22) (24.05) (23.99)  (23.95) (23.59) (23.14) 
                
Observations 372,239 364,933 372,239  362,794 356,635 362,794  420,378 413,073 420,378  443,706 435,899 443,706 
R-squared 0.102 0.102 0.102  0.182 0.184 0.182  0.198 0.198 0.197  0.282 0.282 0.282 
 Weighted-least squares   Country fixed effects   Domestic funds   By country-benchmark type 
 (13) (14) (15)  (16) (17) (18)  (19) (20) (21)  (19) (20) (21) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA) -0.6323***    -0.1062    -0.3772**    -0.3041***   
 (-4.03)    (-1.53)    (-2.25)    (-3.49)   
Explicit indexing (Avg. TSC)  0.0829***    0.0277**    0.1173**    0.1966***  
  (3.74)    (2.04)    (2.10)    (8.75)  
Closet indexing (% TNA)   1.0300***    0.0337    0.1417    0.0419 
   (7.11)    (0.52)    (1.14)    (0.72) 
Active share 0.5367*** 0.5324*** 0.5572***  0.2068*** 0.2070*** 0.2071***  0.5844*** 0.5887*** 0.5859***  0.5848*** 0.5859*** 0.5865*** 
 (14.01) (13.77) (14.80)  (17.52) (17.15) (17.43)  (16.41) (16.40) (16.44)  (23.94) (23.63) (23.84) 
                
Observations 423,103 415,797 423,103  423,103 415,797 423,103  56,202 55,963 56,202  423,103 415,797 423,103 








Instrumental variables regressions of active management 
This table presents estimates of instrumental variables regressions of a fund’s active share at year-end. The first-stage 
dependent variables are the percentage that explicitly indexed funds represent of the TNA in a country (Explicit indexing (% 
TNA)) and the TNA-weighted average total shareholder cost of explicitly indexed funds in a country (Explicit indexing (average 
TSC)). The sample includes open-end active equity mutual funds taken from Lipper for which holdings are available in 
LionShares from 2002 to 2010. In Panel A the unit of observation is a fund’s primary share class i domiciled in country j in year 
t. In Panel B the unit of observation is a fund share class s offered for sale in country k in year t. Regressions include the fund and 
country control variables used in Table 3 as well as year and benchmark dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Robust t-statistics clustered by country of domicile-year (Panel A) or country of sale-year (Panel B) are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Panel A: By country of domicile 





(average TSC) Active share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA)   0.9795***  
   (3.04)  
Explicit indexing (average TSC)    -0.2421*** 
    (-3.89) 
Financial sophistication 0.0316** -0.1169**   
 (2.40) (-2.22)   
DC pension market 0.0583*** -0.2570***   
 (4.48) (-3.93)   
     
Observations 56,590 54,669 56,590 54,669 
R-squared 0.666 0.758 0.211 0.230 
Instruments F-statistic 10.04 8.63   
p-value 0.000 0.000   
Hansen J-statistic   2.604 1.041 
p-value   0.107 0.308 
Panel B: By country of sale 





(average TSC)  Active share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA)   0.6072***  
   (4.36)  
Explicit indexing (average TSC)    -0.0612*** 
    (-2.78) 
Financial sophistication 0.0246*** -0.1943***   
 (4.00) (-6.47)   
DC pension market 0.0521*** -0.1116***   
 (6.96) (-4.53)   
     
Observations 420,262 412,956 420,262 412,956 
R-squared 0.558 0.685 0.110 0.122 
Instruments F-statistic 30.60 31.56   
p-value 0.000 0.000   
Hansen J-statistic   1.545 0.921 







Instrumental variables regression of the total shareholder costs of active funds 
This table presents estimates of instrumental variables regressions of a fund’s yearly total shareholder cost, defined as total 
expense ratio plus one-fifth of the front-end load. The first-stage dependent variables are the percentage that explicitly indexed 
funds represent of the TNA in a country (Explicit indexing (% TNA)), TNA-weighted average total shareholder cost of explicitly 
indexed funds in a country (Explicit indexing (average TSC)), or percentage that active funds with active share measure below 0.6 
represent of the TNA in a country (Closet indexing (% TNA)). The sample includes open-end active equity mutual funds taken 
from Lipper for which holdings are available in LionShares from 2002 to 2010. In Panel A the unit of observation is a fund’s 
primary share class i domiciled in country j in year t. In Panel B the unit of observation is a fund share class s offered for sale in 
country k in year t.  Regressions include the fund and country control variables used in Table 4 as well as year and benchmark 
dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics clustered by country of domicile-year (Panel A) or 
country of sale-year (Panel B) are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
Panel A: By country of domicile  
 First stage regression Second stage regression 
 





(% TNA) Total shareholder cost 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA)    -4.3860***   
    (-3.58)   
Explicit indexing (avg. TSC)     0.6938***  
     (3.36)  
Closet indexing (% TNA)      1.3072*** 
      (3.99) 
Financial sophistication 0.0603*** -0.2664*** -0.1759***    
 (4.62) (-4.05) (-11.68)    
DC pension market 0.0321** -0.1229** -0.0244    
 (2.46) (-2.32) (-1.34)    
       
Observations 56,590 54,669 56,590 56,590 54,669 56,590 
R-squared 0.668 0.752 0.723 0.236 0.329 0.310 
Instruments F-statistic 10.67 9.17 72.13    
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000    
Hansen J-statistic    2.659 0.172 1.798 
p-value    0.103 0.679 0.180 
Panel B: By country of sale 
 First stage regression Second stage regression 
 





(% TNA) Total shareholder cost 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Explicit indexing (% TNA)    -1.1098***   
    (-2.61)   
Explicit indexing (avg. TSC)     0.1695**  
     (2.28)  
Closet indexing (% TNA)      0.8339*** 
      (2.85) 
Financial sophistication 0.0518*** -0.1108*** -0.0840***    
 (6.95) (-4.54) (-9.45)    
DC pension market 0.0247*** -0.1944*** -0.0242***    
 (4.00) (-6.47) (-3.85)    
       
Observations 420,262 412,956 420,262 420,262 412,956 420,262 
R-squared 0.557 0.685 0.546 0.168 0.170 0.169 
Instruments F-statistic 30.52 31.73 45.53    
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000    
Hansen J-statistic    0.263 1.921 0.022 





Determinants of the performance of active funds: robustness 
This table provides presents estimates of panel regressions where the dependent variable is the yearly fund performance. Column (1) uses benchmark-adjusted return which is 
the difference between the fund return and its benchmark return. Column (2) uses four-factor alphas estimated using excess returns. Column (3) uses the information ratio. All 
other columns use benchmark-adjusted return four-factor alphas. Column (4) includes the R-squared measure of Amihud and Goyenko (2013). In column (5) the active share 
measure is calculated as the percentage of portfolio holdings that differ from pure-ETFs that track each benchmark. In column (6) the minimum active share is calculated against 
all possible 88 benchmarks. In column (7) the active share is calculated against the aggregate stock portfolio of active funds. Column (8) presents regressions estimates using 
weighted least squares where the weights are the fund’s total net assets. Column (9) uses the sample of non-U.S. domiciled mutual funds. Column (10) presents regression 
estimates including country fixed effects. Column (11) presents estimates for the sample of domestic funds. The sample includes open-end active equity mutual funds taken from 
Lipper for which holdings are available in LionShares from 2002 to 2010. In Panel A the unit of observation is a fund’s primary share class i domiciled in country j in year t. In 
Panel B the unit of observation is a fund share class s offered for sale in country k in year t. All explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Regressions include the fund and 
country control variables used in Table 7 (coefficients not shown) as well as year and benchmark dummies. Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. Robust t-statistics 
clustered by country of domicile-year (Panel A) or country of sale-year (Panel B) are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Active share 0.0450*** 0.0161** 0.6138*** 0.0318*** 0.0342*** 0.0330*** 0.0311*** 0.0246*** 0.0330*** 0.0141** 0.0214** 
(6.45) (2.46) (7.50) (6.21)  (7.08) (5.50) (5.92) (2.72) (5.36)  (2.31) (2.31) 
Tracking error 0.0184 -0.1073*** 0.2588 -0.0826*** -0.1156*** -0.0737*** -0.0786*** 0.0176 -0.0818* -0.1069*** -0.0944*** 
 (0.56) (-3.00) (0.83) (-3.22) (-5.05) (-3.05) (-3.43) (0.25) (-1.96)  (-4.96) (-3.24) 
TR2    0.0008      
   (0.62)      
            
Observations 50,925 51,570 51,570 51,570 51,570 51,351 49,864 35,310 40,365 51,919 22,099 
R-squared 0.056 0.167 0.087 0.074 0.089 0.074 0.073 0.093 0.083 0.019 0.084 
























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (7) 
Active share 0.0572*** 0.0362*** 1.1120*** 0.0548*** 0.0669*** 0.0544*** 0.0428*** 0.0216*** 0.0591*** 0.0113** 0.0265*** 
(13.76) (7.22) (22.06) (12.96)  (13.52) (12.01) (9.88) (3.75) (12.12)  (2.53) (3.22) 
Tracking error 0.0126 -0.1230*** 0.2701 -0.1221*** -0.1863*** -0.1020*** -0.0993*** 0.1306*** -0.1264*** -0.0455*** -0.1097*** 
 (0.53) (-4.79) (1.11) (-4.99)  (-6.63) (-4.50) (-4.14) (3.12) (-4.03)  (-3.07) (-10.10) 
TR2    0.0008        
   (1.26)        
            
Observations 342,251 346,711 346,711 346,711 288,823 344,446 371,948 346,711 300,604 346,711 49,413 





Differences-in-differences performance estimates using the Passage of Pension Acts 
This table presents differences-in-differences estimates where the dependent variable is a fund’s yearly benchmark-adjusted 
return four-factor alpha. Benchmark-adjusted return is the difference between the fund net return and its benchmark return. Four-
factor alphas are estimated using three years of past monthly benchmark-adjusted fund returns in U.S. dollars with regional 
factors (Asia, Europe, North America or Emerging Markets) or world factors in the case of world funds. The sample includes 
open-end active equity mutual funds taken from Lipper for which holdings are available in LionShares from 2002 to 2010. In 
column (1) the unit of observation is a fund’s primary share class i domiciled in country j in year t. In column (2) the unit of 
observation is a fund share class s offered for sale in country k in year t. Post pension act (year >=0) is a dummy variable that 
equals one if a fund’s country has passed a pension act that year or earlier. Regressions include year and fund fixed effects, and 
the fund and country control variables used in Table 7 (coefficients not shown). Refer to Appendix A for variable definitions. 
Robust t-statistics clustered by country of domicile-year (Panel A) or country of sale-year (Panel B) are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** reflects significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 By country of domicile By country of sale 
(1) (2) 
Post pension act (year >=0) 0.0255** 0.0343*** 
(1.98) (4.05) 
Active share 0.0235 0.0413*** 
 (1.32) (3.42) 
Post pension act (year >=0)  Active share -0.0235 -0.0400*** 
 (-1.39) (-3.50) 
Tracking error -0.1030 -0.0480 
 (-1.20) (-0.88) 
  
Observations 22,802 46,868 
R-squared 0.286 0.299 
 
 
